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I.

INTRODUCTION

Prior to 2008, Senate vacancies1 aroused little debate or controversy.2
However, the presidential election of 2008 sparked interest in the Senate
vacancy process because it created the highest number of senate vacancies
associated with a presidential election.3 One of those vacancies occurred on

1.
A vacancy occurs when there is “a failure to elect at the time prescribed by law,
or by the death, resignation, or incapacity of a person elected.” 2 U.S.C. § 8(a) (2006).
2.
THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40421, FILLING U.S. SENATE
VACANCIES: PERSPECTIVES AND CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2009) (“Of Senate appointments that have occurred since 1913, the vast majority have been filled by temporary
appointments, and the practice appears to have aroused little controversy during that 96-year
period.”).
3.
S.J. Res. 7 and H.J. Res. 21: A Constitutional Amendment Concerning Senate
Vacancies: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the
Judiciary U.S. S. and H.R., Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil
Rights, and Civil Liberties, 111th Cong. 14 (2009) (testimony of Thomas H. Neale, Specialist in American National Government, Congressional Research Service), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-34_54105.PDF (last visited Dec. 29,
2010) [hereinafter Joint Hearing Report] (“The Presidential election of 2008 resulted, directly and indirectly, in the highest number of Senate vacancies within a short period in more
than 60 years.”); see also Bruce Reed, The Wisdom of Crowds, SLATE (Dec. 17, 2008),
http://www.slate.com/id/2207046 (“The four seats opening up next month will be the most
in one year since 1962.”). Four vacancies were created in the Senate: Barack Obama from
Illinois resigned to become President, Joe Biden from Delaware resigned to become Vice
President, Hilary Clinton from New York resigned to become Secretary of State, and Ken
Salazar from Colorado resigned to become Secretary of the Interior. See Kathy Gill, Overview – 111th Congress (2009-2011): Learning about the United States Congress,
ABOUT.COM (2009), http://uspolitics.about.com/od/thecongress/a/111th_Congress.htm (last
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November 16, 2008, when then-Senator from Illinois, Barack Obama, resigned from the Senate to become President of the United States.4 When
Obama resigned, there were two years and forty-eight days left in his term.5
Under Illinois’ Election Code, special elections for senate vacancies must
be held in conjunction with the next general election, which was to be November 2, 2010.6 To fill the vacancy, then-Governor Rod Blagojevich appointed Roland Burris on December 30, 2008.7 Shortly thereafter, the Illinois legislature impeached Governor Blagojevich, and Lieutenant Governor
Pat Quinn assumed the office of Governor.8 Neither Blagojevich nor Quinn
ever issued a writ of election to fill Obama’s Senate seat—the practical
effect being that Burris would complete Obama’s term, and the senator
elected in the next general election would begin a new term on January 3,

visited Dec. 29, 2010). All of these vacancies were subsequently filled by temporary appointments in their respective states. Id.
4.
Jeff Mason, Obama Resigns Senate Seat, Adds White House Staff, REUTERS
(Nov. 16, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4AE1QU20081116.
5.
Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 541 (7th Cir. 2010); Harrison Crumrine, Want to
Be a Senator, but Hate Those Pesky Elections? Just Become a ‘Temporary’ Appointee,
STATE OF ELECTIONS BLOG (Nov. 2, 2010), http://electls.blogs.wm.edu/2010/11/02/twoelections-in-one-the-17th-amendment-and-illinois-senate-seat.
6.
Kevin Lee, Judge: Special Election Needed to Replace Burris, ILL. STATEHOUSE
NEWS (June 17, 2010), http://illinois.statehousenewsonline.com/3303/judge-special-electionneeded-to-replace-burris/. Here, Barack Obama’s resignation came after the 2008 general
elections had already occurred. Illinois’s statute prescribed the next general election as the
date the special election would occur; both would occur in conjunction. Illinois Election
Code provides:
When a vacancy shall occur in the office of United States Senator from
this state, the Governor shall make temporary appointment to fill such
vacancy until the next election of representatives in Congress, at which
time such vacancy shall be filled by election, and the senator so elected
shall take office as soon thereafter as he shall receive his certificate of
election.
10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/25-8 (2011).
7.
Rick Pearson & Ray Long, Blagojevich Snubs Senate, Taps Burris for Seat, CHI.
BREAKING
NEWS
CENTER
(Dec.
30,
2008),
http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2008/12/blagojevich-to-name-burris-to-senate.html.
See Deanna Bellandi, Roland Burris: Blagojevich Appoints Former Attorney General to
Obama’s
Senate
Seat,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Dec.
30,
2008),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/12/30/blagojevich-to-appoint-ro_n_154240.html (providing information on controversies that arose immediately after the appointment.
8.
The Blagojevich scandal was widely publicized. See Ray Long & Rick Pearson,
Impeached Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich has Been Removed from Office, CHI. TRIB. (Jan.
30,
2009),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-blagojevich-impeachmentremoval,0,5791846.story. The Senate voted 59-0 to impeach Blagojevich. Id. The House
voted 114-1 in favor of impeachment earlier. Christopher Wills, Blagojevich Impeached:
House Votes Against Governor 114-1, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 9, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/09/blagojevich-impeachment-h_n_156515.html.

298

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

2011.9 This was practical because Obama’s term was to end on January 3,
2011, anyway; even if a special election was held with the next general
election, the winner would not take office until the following January, the
date Obama’s term would have effectively ended.10 Illinois’ Election Code
therefore allows an appointee to serve the remainder of a senate term when
a vacancy occurs in the final one-third of the term.11 Illinois’ statute is similar to thirty-five other states, most giving similar practical effect to their
statutes in the final one-third of a senate term.12
9.
See Judge, 612 F.3d at 541. As will be discussed in this article, the Seventeenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that a special election be held to fill senate
vacancies. Illinois accepted that this was the practical effect of their statute. See Memorandum from the Illinois Attorney General, Lisa Madigan, to the Illinois Legislature, No. 09001, 2009 WL 530827, at *2 (Feb. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Attorney General Memorandum]
(“Under the current language of section 25-8, U.S. Senator Burris's temporary appointment
will conclude in January 2011 following an election in November 2010, the next election of
representatives in Congress.”).
10.
Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 9, at *2. While this was the current
state of the law (i.e., the natural application of Section 25-8 of the Illinois Election Code),
the memorandum written from the Illinois Attorney General to the Illinois legislature addressed whether the statute could be changed to conduct a special election earlier in the term,
rather than letting the statute run its natural course. See id. The primary issue was whether
the temporary appointee, Roland Burris, had a vested right in the temporary appointment
that would require the law not be changed. Id. at *3-4. Ultimately, the Illinois Attorney
General opined that the law could be changed because Burris had no vested right in the seat.
See id. at *7. Nonetheless, a special election was not held earlier, thereby letting the statute
take its natural course; multiple reasons have been cited as to why the Illinois legislature
ultimately decided against it. See Ray Long, Democrats Vote Down Special Election for
Roland
Burris
Senate
Seat,
CHI.
TRIB.
(March
5,
2009),
http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout_st/2009/03/democrats-vote-down-specialelection-for-roland-burris-senate-seat.html (“‘Why target the only black U.S. senator in the
country?’ [Illinois State Senator Rickey] Hendon asked.”); Caryn Rousseau, Illinois Can’t
Afford Special Election: State Officials, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 15 2008),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/12/15/illinois-cant-afford-spec_n_151173.html (citing
exorbitant costs—between thirty million to fifty million dollars—as the primary reason why
Illinois would not hold a special election). But others suspect the Democratic Party as the
reason why Illinois did not hold a special election. See John Gizzi, Why Illinois Dems Won’t
Permit
Special
Election,
HUMAN
EVENTS
(Dec.
23,
2008),
http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=30025 (“Democrats are holding up a special
election because they fear that under the present political circumstances, a Republican could
win the Senate seat.”).
11.
See Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 9, at *2; Judge, 612 F.3d at 544
(“The State of Illinois appears to agree that this will be the practical effect of the state's
system.”). The Seventh Circuit also noted that “the Illinois State Board of Elections's [sic]
current list of offices that will appear on the November 2, 2010, ballot in Illinois does not
specify that there will be an election on that date to fill the balance of President Obama's
senate term.” Id.
12.
These thirty-five other states are: AZ, CA, CO, DE, FL, GA, HI, ID, IN, IA, KS,
KY, ME, MD, MI, MN, MO, MT, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, NC, ND, OH, PA, SC, SD,
TN, UT, VA, WV, and WY. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FILLING
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Voters in Illinois brought suit alleging Illinois’ Election Code violated
the Seventeenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.13 Prior to this lawsuit, states’ election codes had rarely, if ever, been struck down under the
Seventeenth Amendment.14 However, a unanimous Seventh Circuit panel
held that Illinois’ governor was commanded to issue a writ of election by
the Seventeenth Amendment and that states did not have the discretion to
skip the special election that would elect a replacement for the senate seat.15
VACANCIES
IN
THE
OFFICE
OF
UNITED
STATES
SENATOR,
(2009),
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=18423 (last visited Dec. 25, 2010), compiled from
COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, SENATE ELECTIONS LAW GUIDEBOOK 2000, S.
Doc. No. 106-14 (2d Sess. 2000), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_documents&docid=f:sd014.pdf (“In the following 36
states [including Illinois], the governor makes an appointment to fill a U.S. Senate vacancy,
and the appointee serves until the next regularly-scheduled, statewide general election. The
person elected at that next regularly-held general election serves for the remainder of the
unexpired term, if any. If the term was set to expire at that general election, the person
elected serves a full six-year term.”). This Guidebook provides the statutes of all fifty states.
Because this document was compiled in 2000, some of the statutes have since been changed,
though the vast majority of states have retained the same statute. See id. The only states that
have recently changed their statutes are Connecticut and Rhode Island. See id.; see CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-211 (West 2010) (requiring governor to make temporary appointment
until special election, which must be held within 150 days, or in conjunction with a regularly-scheduled general election if the vacancy occurs within a certain number of days to the
general election); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-4-9 (West Supp. 2003) (requiring a special
election to fill the vacancy in “as early a date” as possible; not allowing temporary appointment in the meantime).
13.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 541, 544. The court stated:
The plaintiffs allege that Governor Quinn's failure to issue a writ of election will injure them because without a writ of election, an election to fill
the senate vacancy left by President Obama will never take place—not
on November 2, 2010, or any other date. The plaintiffs argue that, if
things remain as they are now, Senator Burris will serve until the next
Congress begins on January 3, 2011, at which time an entirely new term
for one of Illinois’s senators will begin.
Id.
14.
See Gietzen v. McMillon, 857 F. Supp. 777, 782 (D. Kan. 1994) (“Since the
Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez, challenges to statutes prescribing the means of
filling vacancies in elected positions have generally been unsuccessful”). Gietzen discusses
multiple cases to support this proposition, including Rodriguez and Valenti. See infra Part
II.E.
15.
Although a unanimous panel of the Seventh Circuit felt the statute was unconstitutional in its practical effect, the plaintiffs were denied injunctive relief because they could
not show irreparable harm. See Judge, 612 F.3d at 555-57.
There is still time for the governor to issue a writ of election that will
call for an election on the date established by Illinois law and that will
make it clear to the voters that they are selecting a replacement for Senator Obama. The district court can easily reach and resolve the merits of
this request before any of the harm that the plaintiffs forecast comes to
pass.
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When Illinois requested a rehearing en banc, or alternatively, an amended
opinion, the Seventh Circuit denied rehearing and amended its opinion to
explicitly state that Illinois had to conduct a special election.16 In light of
the Seventh Circuit’s amended opinion, Illinois expeditiously conducted a
special election in conjunction with the general election held on November
2, 2010.17
This Article analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Judge v. Quinn
and discusses how the language used by that court runs counter to established U.S. Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit case law on related issues
as well as the legislative history of the Seventeenth Amendment.18 Most
recently, the Supreme Court denied Illinois’ petition for writ of certiorari
thereby rendering Judge as valid precedent.19 Consequently, this Article
proposes the considerations necessary for states to update their senate vacancy statutes to comply with Judge.20
To acquire a better understanding of what changes were intended by
the Seventeenth Amendment in regards to senate vacancies, Part II first
provides a brief history of the original vacancy provision and the Seventeenth Amendment.21 It then provides an overview of a senate term to facilitate the discussion of Judge v. Quinn and gives a breakdown of states’ senate vacancy statutes to highlight which statutes are affected by the Seventh
Circuit’s decision.22 Part II next discusses case law that utilizes a Seventeenth Amendment analysis to determine the constitutionality of states’

Id. at 557. No special election was required in the original Seventh Circuit decision because
the plaintiffs’ request was denied on other grounds. See id.
16.
Judge v. Quinn, 387 F. App’x 629, 629-30 (7th Cir. 2010) (amended opinion)
(“On consideration of the petition, so understood, all of the judges on the original panel have
voted to deny rehearing, and no judge in active service has requested a vote on the petition
for rehearing en banc.”).
17.
Rick Pearson, Illinois to Have Two Senate Elections in November: 60-Day Term
to Fill Obama Seat and 6-Year Term to Be on Nov. 2 Ballot, CHI. TRIB. (July 29, 2010),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-07-29/news/ct-met-senate-race-lawsuit20100729_1_burris-appointment-burris-attorney-obama-vacancy; Monica Davey, For One
Senate Seat in Illinois, Two Elections on the Same Day, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/us/politics/01illinois.html.
18.
See discussion infra Part IV (discussing various reasons why Judge was erroneously decided).
19.
See infra note 295 (noting that the Supreme Court denied Illinois’s petition for a
writ of certiorari on June 6, 2011).
20.
See discussion infra Part V (discussing which statutes are affected by Judge and
will need to be updated or otherwise clarified).
21.
See discussion infra Parts II.A-B (discussing legislative history of both senate
vacancy clauses and why those respective systems of appointing senators were ratified).
22.
See discussion infra Parts II.C-D (providing an overview of a senate term and
the diverse statutes that have been adopted by the states).
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vacancy statutes.23 Part II finally describes the congressional efforts made
thus far to curb states’ rights to appoint temporary senators.24 Part III discusses the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Judge v. Quinn, and provides the
procedural history and subsequent amended opinion and injunctive order by
the district court.25 Part IV argues that Judge was erroneously decided in
light of the prior precedent.26 Part IV also stresses that Judge is inconsistent
with the legislative history of the Seventeenth Amendment.27 Part V then
argues that states should modify their statutes to prevent the possibility of
their statutes being challenged in the months before the election.28 It then
proposes various considerations states should take to update their senate
vacancy statutes.29 Part VI provides a brief conclusion by reiterating the
importance of Judge v. Quinn in the larger context of senatorial elections
and the importance of abiding by the Seventh Circuit’s decision.30
II.

BACKGROUND

This section provides a brief history of how senate vacancies were
filled in the original Constitution as well as after the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment.31 It also provides the information necessary to truly
understand the inconsistencies in Judge v. Quinn and the implications this
decision could have on senate special elections.32 Part A discusses the rati23.
See discussion infra Part II.E (discussing Supreme Court precedent (Valenti v.
Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851 (W.D.N.Y. 1969); Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party,
457 U.S. 1 (1892)); and Seventh Circuit precedent (Lynch v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 682
F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1982); Jackson v. Ogilvie, 426 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1970)) that weigh
against the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Judge v. Quinn).
24.
See discussion infra Part II.F (discussing a bill proposed in the House of Representatives and a constitutional amendment proposed in the Senate, and noting that both have
lost momentum and will likely not pass).
25.
See discussion infra Part III (providing thorough discussion of Judge v. Quinn
and all related opinions before and after).
26.
See discussion infra Parts IV.A-E (providing five arguments why Judge is inconsistent with prior Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent).
27.
See discussion infra Part IV.F (arguing that permanent appointments by a Governor were not foreclosed by the legislative history nor the evil sought to be avoided by the
Framers of the Seventeenth Amendment).
28.
See discussion infra Part V.A (providing which states’ statutes will need to be
updated in light of Judge).
29.
See discussion infra Parts V.B-C (providing two steps states will need to undertake to update statutes).
30.
See discussion infra Part V (arguing that Judge will impact senatorial special
elections in the years to come).
31.
See discussion infra Parts II.A-B (providing history of how senators were
elected in colonial America and since the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment).
32.
Judge has very far-reaching implications for the states in regards to how they
can conduct special elections. Almost all states will need to update their senate vacancy
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fication of the original senate vacancy clause that was in the Constitution
before the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment.33 Part B then discusses the legislative debate on the senate vacancy clause of the Seventeenth Amendment in the 62nd Congress—the Congress that ratified the
Amendment.34 Part C provides a brief overview of a senate term to facilitate
the discussion of senate elections, generally.35 Part D provides a breakdown
of states’ special election statutes to fill senate vacancies.36 Part E provides
a synopsis of the case law discussing states’ vacancy statutes under a Seventeenth Amendment analysis.37 Finally, Part F briefly discusses efforts in
Congress that have been made to curb states’ power to appoint replacements in the Senate.38
A.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 AND STATE
LEGISLATURE’S ELECTION OF SENATORS

To acquire a better understanding of why the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the Seventeenth Amendment in Judge is inaccurate, it is first
essential to understand the original senate vacancy clause—the clause that
governed senate vacancies before the Seventeenth Amendment.39 In colonial America, Senators were chosen by state legislators.40 When a vacancy
occurred, state governors made temporary appointments until the next
statutes to at least some extent in order to comply with Judge. See discussion infra Part V
(discussing the updates needed for states to comply with Judge). To better understand these
implications, it is helpful to have the necessary background.
33.
See discussion infra Part II.A (discussing Article I, Section 3, Clause 2 of the
Constitution that provided for state legislative appointments of senators before the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment).
34.
See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing the reasons why the Seventeenth
Amendment was ratified by the states and what changes it brought in regards to senate elections as well as senate vacancies).
35.
See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing how senate elections work and the
second paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment which is the source of states’ powers to
create senate vacancy statutes).
36.
See discussion infra Part II.D (discussing states’ widely divergent statutes that
determine how senate vacancies are filled).
37.
See discussion infra Part II.E (discussing Supreme Court precedent—Valenti v.
Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851 (W.D.N.Y. 1969); Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party,
457 U.S. 1 (1982);—and Seventh Circuit precedent— Lynch v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections,
682 F.2d 93, 94-95 (7th Cir. 1982); Jackson v. Ogilvie, 426 F.2d 1333 (7th. Cir. 1970);—
that weigh against the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Judge v. Quinn).
38.
See discussion infra Part II.F (discussing a bill proposed in the House of Representatives and a constitutional amendment proposed in the Senate, albeit pointing out that
both have lost momentum and will likely not pass).
39.
See infra note 46 and accompanying text (providing the language of the preAmendment Constitution that governed senate vacancies).
40.
“The Senate of the United States shall be . . . chosen by the Legislature thereof.”
U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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meeting of the state legislature, at which point, the legislature would fill the
vacancy with a permanent replacement.41 In the Constitutional Convention
of 1787, the Framers chose state legislative appointments to safeguard the
interests of state governments42 and with the underlying belief that it would
result in better appointments.43 However, there was little discussion on the
original vacancy provision.44 James Madison proposed that state legislatures fill the seat if in session, and during times of recess, a state’s executive
be allowed to fill the seat until the legislature could meet.45 The preSeventeenth Amendment Constitution’s senate vacancy clause states that,
“if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the
Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill
such Vacancies.”46 This system was favorable because it prevented “inconvenient chasms” in the Senate since the state legislatures met only once a
41.
“[I]f Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the
Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the
next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §
3, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. States diverged in how they picked the
Senator. Some states did so by a vote in a joint convention. Others did so by concurrent
votes. 1 GEORGE HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 81 (Russell & Russell 1960)
[hereinafter HAYNES, THE SENATE].
42.
THE
FEDERALIST
No.
62
(James
Madison),
available
at
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=810 (state legislative election allows the states to secure their authority and form a “convenient link” between the two
systems); Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination
of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347, 1352 (1996) [hereinafter Amar,
Indirect Effects] (“Indeed, the legislative election device was explicitly linked to the famous
Madisonian compromise by which the States were given equal suffrage in the Senate.”). See
GEORGE HENRY HAYNES, THE ELECTION OF SENATORS 1-19 (Henry Holt & Co. 1906) for a
discussion on why the Framers chose state legislature appointments.
43.
C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 19 (Transaction Publishers 1995) (“[O]ne of the critical points in
favor of the indirect method of electing senators had been that it rendered them less vulnerable to the impulses of their constituents.”); THE FEDERALIST No. 62, supra note 42 (state
legislative election “has the advantage of ‘favoring a select appointment’.”); Amar, Indirect
Effects, supra note 42, at 1353 (“[S]tate legislators would serve as filters of popular passion
and elect a better class of people to the Senate than would be produced by direct election.”).
44.
Jeffrey D. Mohler, The Constitutional Requirements for Special Elections, 97
DICK. L. REV. 183, 186 (1992) (“While the methods of electing Senators were hotly debated,
the vacancy provision was barely mentioned.”). The primary question that needed to be
addressed was under what circumstances an appointee finish the Senate term. But it was
generally understood from the language of Article I, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution
that a temporary appointee served in the Senate only until the legislature could meet and
appoint a replacement to finish the term. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 2, amended by U.S.
CONST. amend. XVII.
45.
1 JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 61 (E.H. Scott ed.,
Scott, Foresman and Co. 1898) (1840); Mohler, supra note 44, at 186.
46.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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year.47 This system was subsequently adopted by the states and remained
intact until the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in the early 20th
century.48
B.

PASSAGE OF THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE DIRECT
ELECTION OF SENATORS

This system of picking senators changed when the Seventeenth
Amendment was ratified in 1913.49 The Seventeenth Amendment allowed
for the direct election of senators by the people.50 In addition, states were
given discretion to determine whether temporary appointments would be
allowed where a vacancy occurred, and also the discretion to determine the
timing and procedures of a special election.51 Although the direct election
of senators had been proposed on several occasions before the actual pas-

47.
Mr. Edmund Randolph of Virginia, a member of the Committee of Detail,
thought the provision was necessary for these reasons, and because the Senate will have
more power and consist of a smaller number than the House of Representatives, a vacancy
would be more problematic. CREATION OF THE SENATE: FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION PHILADELPHIA, S. DOC. NO. 100-7, at 43 (1937), available at
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SchulzCreationSenate.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 29, 2010) [hereinafter CREATION OF THE SENATE]; see also NEALE, supra note 2,
at 2.
48.
The Seventeenth Amendment was passed on 1913, thereby ending state legislators’ right to pick senators. See Direct Election of Senators, U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Direct_Election_Senators.htm
(last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
49.
See NEALE, supra note 2, at 1 (discussing the passage of the Seventeenth
Amendment). See HAYNES, THE SENATE, supra note 41, at 80-103 (providing a complete
discussion of the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment). Various studies were done in
the immediate ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment to see what differences were
apparent between the senators elected before the Seventeenth Amendment and those senators elected afterwards (since both served side-by-side in the immediate years after the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment). See Scott R. Meinke, Institutional Change and the
Electoral Connection in the Senate: Revisiting the Effects of Direct Election, POL. RES. Q. at
445, 453-54 (Sept. 2008) (finding increased sponsorship and participation among elected
senators as compared to legislatively appointed senators).
50.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII § 1 states, in pertinent part: “The Senate of the
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people
thereof.”
51.
The second paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment states:
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate,
the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill
such vacancies: Provided, [t]hat the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the
people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII § 2 (emphasis in original).
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sage of the Seventeenth Amendment, the proposals never passed.52 But
multiple issues in the early twentieth century led to the direct election of
senators,53 including corruption and bribery charges54 and the belief that
private interest groups had overtaken state legislatures to the point where
appointed senators no longer represented the constituency.55 Indeed, statements by Senators in the years immediately preceding the passage of the
52.
The clamor for change first arose in the House of Representatives. HAYNES, THE
SENATE, supra note 41, at 96. The proposed amendment had been approved six times between the years of 1893 and 1911 by an overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives. However, it was not allowed to come to a vote in the Senate. George H. Haynes, The
Changing Senate, 200 N. AM. REV. 222, at 222 (Aug. 1914) [hereinafter Haynes, Changing
Senate]. See Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens’
Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 536-37 (1997) for a brief
summary of these early proposals. These proposals included a proposal just four months
prior to the actual ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in May, 1913. Haynes, Changing Senate, supra note 52, at 222-23 (noting that the proposed amendment was brought to
the floor at the first session of the 62nd Congress, but was defeated).
53.
The Senate even received multiple direct petitions from farmers’ associations,
labor groups, and other citizen groups calling for direct election. HAYNES, THE SENATE,
supra note 41, at 97; Ralph A. Rossum, California and the Seventeenth Amendment, 6
NEXUS 101, 112 (2001). This issue became increasingly common in Democratic and Populist platforms at the state level but was eventually taken up by national parties as well.
HAYNES, THE SENATE, supra note 41, at 97.
54.
It is worth noting that corruption and bribery were the exception rather than the
norm, but these cases were highly publicized and undermined support for state legislative
elections. Mohler, supra note 44, at 191 (“The corruption of the state legislatures was one of
the primary concerns of the Senate.”); Roger G. Brooks, Comment, Garcia, the Seventeenth
Amendment, and the Role of the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 189, 200 (1987) (“Corruption, of both state legislators and senators, was the
greatest evil blamed on the system of indirect election.”). In many respects, the need for
reform was most apparent in Illinois. The alleged bribery scandal relating to Senator William
Lorimer has been coined the “final outrage perpetrated under the former method of electing
senators.” See HOEBEKE, supra note 43, at 91-92. Lorimer was accused of bribing four state
legislators to be elected to the Senate seat. Id. at 92. He was expelled in 1912, halfway
through his term. Id.; see also John D. Buenker, The Urban Political Machine and the Seventeenth Amendment, 56 J. AM. HIST. 305, 314 (Sept. 1969) (“[T]he Illinois Legislature
[became] a symbol for all those who desired . . . direct election.”). This corruption was not
always present; from the Constitution’s founding to 1872, there was only one proven instance of bribery of state legislatures. HOEBEKE, supra note 43, at 91 (this instance involved
Alexander Caldwell of Arkansas). However, there were fifteen proven instances of bribery
in the next three decades. HAYNES, THE SENATE, supra note 41, at 187; HOEBEKE, supra note
43, at 91.
55.
Amar, Indirect Effects, supra note 42, at 1353 (“The state legislatures were
tainted by their reliance on powerful and narrowly private influences, and this taint carried
over to the Senators selected as well.”). But see Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007, 1055
(1994) [hereinafter Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests] (arguing that special interest
groups actually profited from the Seventeenth Amendment and it only increased their powers).
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Seventeenth Amendment reflected their belief that the old senatorial election
system
promoted
corruption.56
57
At the same time, political deadlocks were increasing, caused by state
legislatures’ inability to decide on a replacement senator.58 The Seventeenth
Amendment eventually passed because politicians at both the state and national level believed these evils could be cured only by the direct election of
senators.59
56.

Senator Bradley stated:
The People are denied the right to choose their own Senators under this
Constitution, which was so framed as to make easy the corrupt election
of Senators. It was so framed–not by intent but by its mechanism—as to
permit senatorships to be bought with comparative ease and safety; it
was so framed . . . by its mechanism—as to permit corruption and successful rascality.
47 CONG. REC. 1919 (1911) (statement of Sen. Bradley). Other Senators believed it would
clean the government of special interest groups. See 47 CONG. REC. 1921 (1911) (Statement
of Senator Owen) (“I am weary of seeing corrupt special interests put their hands secretly
upon the governing function . . . through this system of machine politics, where representative government has very nearly met its destruction.”).
57.
Deadlocks often resulted when one party controlled the state assembly or house
and another the state senate. Rossum, supra note 53, at 106.
58.
There were 46 deadlocks across 20 states in the period between 1891 and 1905.
Todd J, Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth
Amendment and its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165,
198 (1997). Deadlocks most commonly led to a disruption of state legislatures’ handling of
state affairs. Mohler, supra note 44, at 187. Where there was a deadlock in the legislature,
the animosities that arose projected themselves into even the most non-partisan of issues.
HAYNES, THE SENATE, supra note 41, at 93. Deadlocks even disrupted the Senate from national matters. Rossum, supra note 53, at 109 (The Senate had the “onerous burden of determining whether a state’s senators had, in fact, been properly elected.”). There were a
whole host of “perplexing questions” that arose since there was no uniform regulation of the
manner of senatorial elections. HAYNES, THE SENATE, supra note 41, at 82. One notable
example was the election of an Indiana Senator in which a minority of the Indiana Senate,
which had been in deadlock with the House, met with a majority of the House and elected a
senator. The Senate then had to deal with formal protests from other legislatures that the
candidate was not properly chosen. There was a similar case from Pennsylvania as well.
HAYNES, THE ELECTION OF SENATORS, supra note 42, at 21. Finally, deadlocks deprived a
state of representation in the Senate. See Rossum, California and the Seventeenth Amendment, supra note 53, at 111. The most notable example is Delaware, which was represented
by only one senator in three Congresses and had no representation from 1901 to 1903. Id.
Moreover, deadlocks were closely related to bribery in that a deadlock often increased the
possibility of bribery to end the deadlock. Haynes, Changing Senate, supra note 52, at 231
(“[P]rotracted deadlocks have not only aroused bitter animosities, but have often resulted . . .
in abundant rumors—too often well-grounded—of bribery and corruption.”); Rossum, supra
note 53, at 111 (“A second factor [of bribery and corruption] often followed on the heels of
the first: Scandal resulted when deadlocks were occasionally loosened by the lubricant of
bribe money.”).
59.
Haynes, Changing Senate, supra note 52, at 223 (“By [June 12, 1911,] it had
become evident that the amendment was in accord with a rising and imperative public sen-

2012]

SPECIAL ELECTION REQUIREMENT

307

But like the Constitutional Convention of 1787, debate over the vacancy provision was nonexistent.60 In Senator Bristow’s proposal of the
Seventeenth Amendment, he stressed that a writ of election should be filed
by the governor and an election should be held;61 however, there was no
debate regarding the circumstances in which a writ would be excused.62
Moreover, Senator Bristow clarified that his proposal was desirable because
“it makes the least possible change in the Constitution to accomplish the
purposes desired; that is, the election of Senators by popular vote.”63 In
regards to the vacancy provision, no substantial change was intended by
Senator Bristow, except where a special election was held, it would be

timent.”); Kris W. Kobach, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971, 1977 (1994) (“Starting in 1901, various states
passed resolutions calling for a national convention to propose an amendment.”). The best
“pre-Seventeenth Amendment” solution was devised by Oregon, and this “Oregon Initiative” was simulated in various states before the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment.
In Oregon, a law was passed by which the candidate for the U.S. Senate be nominated by
voter petitions. To bind state lawmakers to the senate candidate picked by the voters, candidates for state legislatures were asked to sign one of two public statements. The first public
statement was a pledge to appoint whichever candidate received the highest number of votes
from the people. The second public statement “indicated that the legislator would ‘consider
the vote of the people [but only] as nothing more than a recommendation.’” Not surprisingly,
very few state legislature hopefuls picked the second option. Id. at 1978 (quoting 1 GEORGE
H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND PRACTICE 96-97 (1938)).
Public support is apparent also by the astounding speed with which this amendment was
ratified by the states. The Seventeenth Amendment was submitted to the legislatures of the
states on May 16, 1912. By May 31, 1913, three-fourths of the states had approved it.
HAYNES, THE SENATE, supra note 41, at 116. Interestingly, the Seventeenth Amendment
wasn’t promoted to make the senate system more efficient; it was only to prevent the problems associated with state legislators picking senators. See Haynes, Changing Senate, supra
note 52, at 231 (“[T]he Seventeenth Amendment arose far more from observation of the
influence of the legislative election of Senators . . . than from optimistic assurance that the
personnel or efficiency of the Senate would be notably improved by popular election.”).
60.
See 47 CONG. REC. 1482-86 (1911) (debate regarding Seventeenth Amendment).
61.
Id. at 1482-83 (statement of Sen. Bristow) (opining that this vacancy clause
utilized similar language to the House of Representatives vacancy clause and that a writ of
election was necessary).
62.
Id. at 1483 (statement of Sen. Bristow) (“It is unnecessary for me to make any
extended remarks in regard to my substitute for the joint resolution.”); see also Paul Taylor,
Proposals to Prevent Discontinuity in Government and Preserve the Right to Elected Representation, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 435, 438 n.13 (2004) (“[R]emarks [on the vacancy provision of the Seventeenth Amendment] are quite short, focusing mainly on grammatical points,
and they do not include reference to any policy rationale behind the application of the provision.”).
63.
47 CONG. REC. 1482 (1911) (statement of Sen. Bristow) (“The only change in
section 3 is the substitution of the words ‘elected by the people thereof’ for the words ‘chosen by the legislature thereof.’ This certainly is as simple a change as can be made.”).

308

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

filled by the people rather than state legislatures.64 Finally, with the appointment power, Senator Bristow opined that it carried over from the previous Constitution, and that no change was intended in his Amendment
with how appointments occurred in the past,65 except that the governor had
to issue the writ of election and hold a special election.66 Senator Bristow
thus took a very conservative approach with his constitutional proposal.67
Prior debates on the vacancy provision concentrated mostly on the
wording of the provision, such as using the singular form of the word “vacancy” rather than the plural form “vacancies” for clarity.68 However, there
is nothing in the debates that could have helped states draft their vacancy
statutes or guided courts in their determination as to whether a state’s statute was in compliance with the Seventeenth Amendment.69 States accordingly had to craft statutes based on their own interpretations of the Seventeenth Amendment.70
64.
Id. at 1482 (Statement of Sen. Bristow) (“I have used the exact language used in
the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of electors who will vote for Senator that is
used in prescribing the qualifications of electors who vote for Members of Congress—
nothing more and nothing less.”).
65.
Id. at 1483 (Statement of Sen. Bristow) (“That is practically the same provision
which now exists in the case of a vacancy. The governor of the state may appoint a Senator
until the legislature elects.”).
66.
Id. (Statement of Sen. Bristow) (“That is, I use exactly the same language in
directing the governor to call special elections for the election of Senators to fill vacancies
that is used in the Constitution in directing him to issue writs of election to fill vacancies in
the House of Representatives.”).
67.
As will be discussed infra Part IV.F, this conservative approach by Senator
Bristow weighs against the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the senate vacancy clause of
the Seventeenth Amendment in Judge v. Quinn.
68.
As mentioned earlier, this amendment was proposed just a few months prior, but
was rejected. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. However, there was some debate on
this provision, albeit the debate did not discuss complications which could arise and whether
there were any circumstances that would excuse the states from conducting a special election. See 47 CONG. REC. 238 (Apr. 13, 1911) (statement of Sen. Mann) (arguing that the
word “vacancy” should be used in singular form because it could lead to ambiguity in the
future, especially since this will be in the Constitution and difficult to change). These debates were not very helpful.
69.
Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 866 (W.D. N.Y. 1969), aff’d 393 U.S.
405 (1969) (“[T]he legislative history of the Amendment sheds little light on the interpretation of the vacancy provision.”); Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 941 F.2d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 1991)
(“[T]here does not appear to have been any discussion in the floor debates as to how midterm vacancies should be filled.”).
70.
See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 12, for states’
breakdown concerning the vacancy provision. However, as mentioned, some states have
changed their statutes since this compilation, although the states’ breakdown remains just as
diverse. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. See discussion infra Part II.D. for the
breakdown and categorizations of states’ statutes. See discussion infra Part III.A for a discussion of Illinois’ statute.
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OVERVIEW OF A SENATE TERM AS DERIVED FROM THE SEVENTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTES

It is first helpful to provide an overview of a senate term to facilitate
the discussion of Judge and senate elections.71 Senate terms and elections
are governed by the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and state election
codes.72 The primary change brought about by the Seventeenth Amendment
was the shift from state legislators picking senators to the direct election of
senators by the people.73 The first paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: “The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof.”74
Additionally, Senate terms are divided into groups of thirds to allow for
staggered elections.75 The Constitution also provides wide discretion to
state legislatures to determine “[t]he Times, Places and Manner” of holding
general election but only insofar as Congress has not regulated it.76 In accordance with this Section, Congress has established that Senate elections

71.
It is important to understand these details; for example, when general elections
are required, when senators typically take office, etc. because these rules for the general
election have also come to govern special elections in those states that require the special
election occur in conjunction with the general election. See discussion infra Part II.D (providing breakdown of states’ statutes and which states require conducting the special election
with the next general election). This was precisely the case in Illinois. See discussion infra
Part III.A (discussing Illinois’ senate vacancy statute).
72.
It is a combination of all of these that govern senatorial elections. The broadest
rules are laid out in the Constitution, then by federal statutes, and then state statutes.
73.
See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing the changes brought forth by ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment).
74.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
75.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 provides:
[Senators] shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes. The
Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration
of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth
Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that
one third may be chosen every second Year.
This clause was not amended by the Seventeenth Amendment. Staggered elections were
established for senators to insulate their decisions from the public. See Vik D. Amar, The
Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. 1111, 1126-27 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, Senate
and the Constitution] (“Similarly, while the Court historically may appear to be the most
continuous body, the Senate is the only institution that cannot—short of amendment—‘turn
over’ at one time . . . because of staggered elections.”). This prevented a scenario where the
people voted out of office all of the Senators due to unpopular legislation. Id.
76.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as
to the Places of choosing Senators.”).
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will occur in the first week of November,77 and the winner will take office
on January 3rd.78 However, these regulations apply only to general elections, not special elections.79
Special elections for senate vacancies80 are governed by the second
paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment and state election codes.81 The
second paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment provides:
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: [p]rovided,
[t]hat the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.82
States have adopted widely divergent statutes in light of the language giving states the option of allowing temporary appointments or leaving the seat
vacant until a special election is conducted.83 The most common interpretation, as adopted by thirty-six states including Illinois, would be challenged
in Judge.84

77.
2 U.S.C. § 7 (1934) (stating that elections are held “[t]he Tuesday next after the
1st Monday in November”).
78.
Id. The winner takes office “on the 3d day of January next [year] thereafter.” Id.
79.
See generally, 2 U.S.C. § 7 (2010) (mentioning only general elections as being
governed by federal statutes). In contrast, states have the authority to conduct special elections as they see fit. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (providing language of
second paragraph of Seventeenth Amendment, which provides authority to states to “direct”
special elections).
80.
A vacancy occurs when there is “a failure to elect at the time prescribed by law,
or by the death, resignation, or incapacity of a person elected.” 2 U.S.C. § 8 (2010).
81.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 2.
82.
Id.
83.
This is clear from the language of the Seventeenth Amendment which states:
“Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make
temporary appointments.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (emphasis added). See also NEALE,
supra note 2, at 1 (“The 17th Amendment . . . gave states the option of filling Senate vacancies by election or by temporary gubernatorial appointment.”); Eric Zom, How Other States
Fill
Senate
Vacancies,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Dec.
3,
2008,
4:03
PM),
http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/2008/12/how-other-states-fillsenate-vacancies.html.
84.
See infra Part III.C for a discussion of Judge v. Quinn.
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BREAKDOWN OF STATES’ SPECIAL ELECTION STATUTES

All fifty states have passed senate vacancy provisions.85 Five states—
the “special elections only” states—bypass temporary appointments and
leave the seat vacant until a special election is held within a certain number
of days after the vacancy.86 The remaining forty-five states allow temporary
appointments to some extent.87
Of these forty-five states, seven states—the “short term appointment”
states—allow for temporary appointments but require that special election
be held shortly after the vacancy is created.88 Two states—the “hybrid”
states—have adopted a system in which the governor must make a temporary appointment and call for a special election where there is more than
one year in the term.89 However, an appointment is permanent where there

85.
See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 12 (providing a
breakdown of the states’ statutes).
86.
These five states are: AK, OK, OR, RI and WI. Id. According to this compilation, only four states (OK, OR, RI and WI) are “special election only” states. Id. However, a
recent referendum in Alaska amended this statute, which requires that the state conduct a
special election “forthwith” but leaves out the provision which granted temporary appointment powers to the governor. See NEALE, supra note 2, at 8, in which the author states:
[I]n a referendum passed by the voters of Alaska, a law was adopted that
took effect the same day as the legislative enactment, calling for a special election between 60 and 90 days after a United States Senate vacancy but without expressly authorizing the governor to make a temporary appointment.
The Alaska Supreme Court has made clear that this is precisely what distinguishes the referendum statute that was passed from the prior statute that it overturned. See Trust the People
v. Alaska, 113 P.3d 613, 620 (Alaska 2005) (finding that referendum statute was not “substantially the same” as Alaska statute currently in force because it omitted language that
allowed governor to make temporary appointments. Therefore, referendum statute was valid
when passed).
87.
See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 12 (noting
states that do allow appointments can be further broken into three types).
88.
Id. These seven states are: AL, AR, CT, MA, TX, VT and WA. Vermont and
Washington require a special election within 90 days, Alabama requires a special election
“forthwith,” Alaska requires a special election between 60 and 90 days, and Massachusetts
requires a special election within 145-160 days. Id. Massachusetts used to be in the “special
election only” category but changed on the request of ailing Senator Ted Kennedy who did
not want his state to go unrepresented while the health care debate was proceeding in the
Senate. See Ailing Ted Kennedy Urges Speedy Replacement Process for Senate Seat, NY
DAILY
NEWS
(Aug.
20,
2009,
11:45
AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2009/08/20/2009-0820_ailing_ted_kennedy_urges_speedy_replacement_process.html.
89.
See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 12. These two
states are: LA and MS. See id. When there is more than a year left in the term, they are essentially the same as the “short term appointment” states. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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is less than one year left in the term.90 The remaining thirty-six states, including Illinois—the “joint election only” states—require that the governor
pick a temporary appointment until the next general election, at which
point, both the general election and the special election occur in conjunction.91 Most of these “joint election only” states also do not allow the special election to occur in conjunction with the general election when the vacancy occurs within a certain number of days to a general election; in such
an instance, the appointment would remain in office until the next general
election.92 It is thus possible for a temporary appointee to stay in office for
up to thirty months.93 Whenever a special election was held in these states,
the elected candidate would take office when the next Congressional session started.94 So in a scenario where the special election would occur si90.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §18:1278 (2010) (“If a vacancy occurs in the office of
United States senator and the unexpired term is more than one year, an appointment to fill
the vacancy shall be temporary.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-855 (2010) (“[T]he Governor
shall . . . issue his proclamation for an election to be held in the state to elect a Senator to fill
such unexpired term as may remain, provided the unexpired term is more than twelve (12)
months.”).
91.
See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 12.
92.
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 59-910 (West 2007) (requiring the vacancy occur
at least thirty days before the general election for the joint election to occur, otherwise, the
state must wait until the next general election); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-542 (West 2010)
(requiring vacancy occur at least forty days before the general election, otherwise, the state
must wait until the next general election). Such a cut-off period was reasonable because if
the vacancy occurred too close to the general election, it would require that the state take
shortcuts to hold the two elections simultaneously, such as bypassing filing periods and
primaries, and it could also lead to voter confusion. See discussion infra Part II.E for a discussion of Valenti.
93.
NEALE, supra note 2, at 10 ((“[A]ppointed Senators from these states ‘could
theoretically serve as long as 30 months.’”) (quoting S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
SUBCOMM. ON THE CONST., HOW STATES FILL U.S. SENATE VACANCIES: A SURVEY OF STATE
LAWS 3 (Feb. 2009))); Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 867-68 (W.D. N.Y. 1969),
aff’d 393 U.S. 405 (1969) (statute allowing up to a 29-month appointment was constitutional). Valenti is discussed infra Part II.E. Today, the longest vacancy is created by Ohio’s
statute. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3521.02 (West 1995) (“The appointee shall hold office .
. . succeeding the next regular state election that occurs more than one hundred eighty days
after the vacancy happens.”). Accordingly, the vacancy must occur 180 days before the
general election in order for a joint election to occur, otherwise, voters must wait until the
next general election. Id. This could lead to a vacancy for two years and six months if, for
example, the vacancy occurred in May of an even-numbered year. See id.
94.
Some states explicitly stated that an appointee would last until the next congressional session started on January 3. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-20 (2010) (“Governor
may fill the place by appointment which shall be for the period of time intervening between
the date of such appointment and January third following the next succeeding general election.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111 (West 2010) (“[T]emporary successor [will] serve
until a successor for the remainder of the unexpired term is elected at the next general election and takes office on the first Monday of the following January.”). Some states explicitly
allow an appointment to be permanent where the term was to end the January after the gen-
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multaneously with a general election in the year immediately preceding the
end of the term, the natural effect of these statutes is to allow the temporary
appointee to finish the term.95 This practice would be challenged under the
Seventeenth Amendment in Judge.96
E.

CASE LAW ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATES’ SENATE VACANCY
STATUTES

Only a handful of cases have assessed states’ vacancy statutes under a
Seventeenth Amendment analysis prior to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
eral election anyways. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10720 (West 2010) (“However, whenever a vacancy occurs within a term fixed by law to expire on the third day of January following the next general election, the person so appointed shall hold office for the remainder
of the unexpired term.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-11-1 (2010) (“No special election, to fill
a vacancy, may be held if the term of office of the appointed senator expires in the month of
January immediately following the next general election that would occur after the vacancy.”). But even though most statutes did not explicitly state the appointee would serve
until the following January, this was the practical effect of the statutes, as exemplified by
Illinois’ statute. See, e.g., Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 9, at *2 (“Under the
current language of section 25-8, U.S. Senator Burris's temporary appointment will conclude
in January 2011 following an election in November 2010, the next election of representatives in Congress.”). Illinois was not alone in its dilemma; this situation also arose in two
other states and both states gave similar effect to their statutes. First, in Florida, Governor
Charlie Crist appointed his Chief of Staff, George LeMieux, to serve out the end of Senator
Mel Martinez’s seat. Brendan Farrington, George LeMieux Picked by Crist to Replace Sen.
Mel
Martinez,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Aug.
28,
2009,
6:57
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/28/george-lemieux-picked-by-_n_271274.html.
Senator LeMieux will serve out the remainder of the term and Marco Rubio, the winner of
the Senate race, will be sworn in on January 3, 2011. Id. Second, in Colorado, Governor Bill
Ritter appointed Michael Bennet to serve out the remainder of Ken Salazar’s Senate seat
(Salazar had resigned to become Secretary of Interior under Obama). Steven K. Paulson,
Michael Bennett Appointed Colorado Senator, Will Replace Ken Salazar, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 3, 2009, 8:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/03/michael-bennetappointed-_n_155009.html. Here too, no special election was held and Bennet served out the
remainder of the term. Id. In essence, the only difference between Illinois, Florida, and Colorado, is that this practice was challenged in Illinois but was not challenged in Florida or
Colorado. This scenario is not uncommon; it occurred two more times in recent history. New
Jersey appointed Robert Menendez in January, 2006, and he was appointed to a full six year
term ten months later. See Laura Pedrick, Robert Menendez, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/robert_menendez/index.html
(last visited Dec. 28, 2010). Finally, Lisa Murkowski was appointed to finish a senate term
in
Alaska
in
2002.
See
Lisa
Murkowski
Biography,
USNEWS,
http://www.usnews.com/congress/murkowski-lisa (last visited Dec. 28, 2010).
95.
The Seventh Circuit, in Judge, noted that of the 193 vacancies that have occurred between the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment to the election of President
Obama, twenty-seven of those vacancies were filled by appointees who served the remainder
of the senate term in question. Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 556 (7th Cir. 2010). A special
election never took place in those twenty-seven cases. Id.
96.
Id. at 537.
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Judge.97 This case law has been largely favorable to the states.98
States have substantial discretion to determine when a special election
will be held, even if it allows a temporary appointee to remain in office for
up to twenty-nine months.99 In Valenti v. Rockefeller, a three-judge district
court panel held that a New York election statute that required that a senate
special election occur in conjunction with the next general election was
constitutional under the Seventeenth Amendment.100 The United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision.101
The district court reasoned that the vacancy provision of the Seventeenth Amendment grants states reasonable discretion concerning the timing of vacancy elections.102 New York’s decision to wait until the next general election was reasonable because it: (1) maximized voter turnout; (2)
made financing a campaign easier since it is more difficult to do in an off97.
Temporary appointments have generally aroused little controversy. See supra
note 2 and accompanying text.
98.
See NEALE, supra note 2 and accompanying text. This section discusses Valenti
and Rodriguez—two Supreme Court cases, and Lynch and Jackson—two Seventh Circuit
cases. All of these are largely favorable to states, except Jackson, which requires a special
election when a vacancy occurs in the House of Representatives. See infra Part II.E (discussion of Jackson).
99.
Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 867-68 (W.D. N.Y. 1969), aff’d 393
U.S. 405 (1969).
100.
Id. In Valenti, the vacancy was created by the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy on June 6, 1968. Id. at 853. New York Election Code provided that special elections
must be held in conjunction with the next general election if the vacancy occurs within sixty
days of the primary. Id. New York’s statute could cause up to a twenty-nine month delay
before a replacement senator was chosen since the statute required that New York wait until
the next general election where the vacancy occurs less than 60 days prior to the primaries.
See id. New York’s statute is similar to the one challenged in Illinois in Judge v. Quinn. See
discussion infra, Part III.A (Illinois requires that special elections occur in conjunction with
the next general election).
101.
Valenti v. Rockefeller, 393 U.S. 405 (1969). A summary affirmance is uncommon in the Supreme Court, albeit not rare. It occurs when the Supreme Court affirms the
lower court’s decision without issuing an opinion. It adopts the reasoning of the lower court.
However, the Supreme Court has opined that a summary affirmance extends no further than
the “precise issues” in that case. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784-85 n.5
(1983) (“[T]he precedential effect of a summary affirmance extends no further than ‘the
precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions.’”). However, lower courts
will give more weight to summary affirmances when the Supreme Court discusses portions
of those lower court opinions in subsequent opinions. See discussion infra Part III.B (stating
that Valenti was not merely “an aside” unrelated to Rodriguez, but played a meaningful part
in the Court’s analysis in Rodriguez).
102.
Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 866. Under a “natural reading” of the Seventeenth
Amendment, states can control both the timing of the special election and procedures to be
used in selecting candidates. Id. at 856. This is apparent from the language of the Seventeenth Amendment which allows states to “direct” the logistics of a special election. U.S.
CONST. amend. XVII § 2 (a temporary appointment may stay in office until an election is
held “as the legislature may direct”).
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year; and (3) served the states’ interests because the inconvenience that
would result to the state outweighed any benefit the people would get in
getting to vote earlier.103 But the court clarified that a statute would be
problematic if it allowed for the Governor’s appointee to serve out the remainder of the term “regardless of its length.”104
There were also substantial differences between the Senate and the
House of Representatives that justified reading the vacancy provisions of
the two Houses differently.105 Most notably, the vacancy provision applicable to the House of Representatives does not authorize temporary appointments.106 In contrast, when a vacancy occurred in the Senate, a state was
still represented by the other senator as well as a temporary appointee.107
103.
Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 859. The court also provided other reasons. First, New
York required that primaries be held even for a special election. Id. This was a decision
made by the New York Legislature in light of New York’s unique voting history. Id. Prior to
1967, New York did not have primaries; instead, a resident voted for delegates to their
party’s nominating convention which then nominated the candidate. Id. However, there was
debate over whether this practice resulted in “boss” dominated conventions. Id. Subsequently, the New York Legislature enacted a primary system to provide more choices to the
voters. Id. Ironically, the district court notes that if it required a prompt election in 1968, the
candidates would need to be picked by nomination conventions, and this is the exact scenario New York sought to avoid. Id. Consequently, even though the vacancy in this instance
occurred before the general election, New York voters would have to wait until the next
general election since the primaries had passed already. Id. Third, New York’s decision to
hold primaries in the fall rather than the spring was also reasonable. Id. New York Legislators believed voter turnout for primaries would be higher in the spring rather than the fall
because it created a larger gap between the two occasions when voters would have to vote.
Id. In addition, the legislature believed it would be beneficial to have additional time after
the nominees had been selected, particularly for candidates campaigning against an incumbent. Id. Finally, moving the primary to the spring was practical for the courts. Id. Under the
previous statute, the New York Court of Appeals had to preside almost until Election Day in
order to rule on challenges stemming from the fall primary. Id. Moving the primary to the
spring prevented this inconvenience. Id. The court also opined that it was “highly significant” that many states had interpreted the Seventeenth Amendment to grant such authority.
Id. at 855-56 (“It is highly significant that most legislatures, as indicated by the Senatorial
vacancy statutes of the 50 states, have interpreted the Seventeenth Amendment as granting to
the states a discretion . . . sufficiently broad to encompass the terms of New York[’s] Election Law.” (citation omitted)).
104.
Id. at 856. This dictum by the Court will play a substantial role in the criticism
of Judge v. Quinn. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
105.
Id. at 863. This part of the decision was in response to the Plaintiffs’ argument
that the vacancy clause of the Seventeenth Amendment should be read analogous to the
vacancy provision applicable to the House of Representatives. Id. at 863.
106.
Id. House of Representative seats remain empty until the state can organize an
election in that district. Id. A special election was thus required without delay when a vacancy occurred in the House of Representatives because a district went without representation in the meantime. Id.
107.
Id. Each state is afforded two senators, so the other elected senator represents
the state as well. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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States therefore can delay a special election for up to twenty-nine months
provided that the state had reasonable interests in doing so.108
A special election was scheduled in the aftermath of Valenti in conjunction with the next general election, but was never actually conducted;
the appointee, Charles Goodell was allowed to finish the term.109
An appointee can also finish a term where a state has determined that
the impracticalities and costs of a special election outweigh the voters’ right
to an elected representative.110 In reaching this conclusion in Rodriguez v.
Popular Democratic Party, the Supreme Court relied almost exclusively on
its prior ruling in Valenti.111 Because the Seventeenth Amendment permitted a state to forgo a special election in favor of an appointment, it followed
that a state could do the same in its own legislature.112 Appointments served
108.
Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 867-68. There was a third argument brought up by the
plaintiffs that was not accepted by the court. Id. at 863. The plaintiffs argued that the vacancy provision should be analogized to the previous vacancy provision in the Constitution.
Id. This clause stated that “if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the
Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. However, even under the
previous vacancy provision, temporary appointments had served for more than a year, including a vacancy that lasted for 19 months. Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 864-65. Some legislatures in colonial America also met in alternating years, and because a special session of
legislature was not required to fill vacancies, it was possible to have vacancies lasting for
two years. Id.
109.
Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 556 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Notably, there was never
an election to fill the vacancy that was the subject of Valenti v. Rockefeller.”); See also
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, BIOGRAPHY OF CHARLES
ELLSWORTH GOODELL, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=G000282
(last visited Dec. 23, 2010) (noting that Goodell “served from September 10, 1968, to January 3, 1971.”).
110.
Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 14 (1982). In Rodriguez,
the plaintiffs alleged that a Puerto Rico statute allowing the fallen incumbent’s political
party to permanently fill the vacant seat in the State Legislative Assembly was unconstitutional because it denied them the right to vote for their representative. Id. at 3. Under the
applicable Puerto Rico Electoral Law, a vacancy that occurred with less than 15 months
remaining in the term could be filled permanently by the party to which the representative
belonged. Id. Prior to appeal to the Supreme Court, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court held that
such an election scheme was constitutional. Id. The fact that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court
felt it was constitutional influenced the Supreme Court as well. Id. at 10.
111.
Id. at 11.
112.
Id. Although the vacancy at issue was a state senate seat, the Supreme Court
nonetheless utilized the Seventeenth Amendment, opining that it was the base level of vacancy election rights. See id. The Court also conceded that this had some effect on voters’
rights. See id. However, the effect was “minimal” and did not fall disproportionately on any
discernible group of voters. Id. at 12. (“In this case we are confronted with no fundamental
imperfection in the functioning of democracy. No political party or portion of the state’s
citizens can claim it is permanently disadvantaged” (quoting Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 867)).
However, there are several cases in history where otherwise constitutional schemes are
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the state’s legitimate interest in ensuring vacancies are filled promptly
without the expense and inconvenience of a special election.113 Therefore, a
permanent appointment to the state legislature was constitutional under a
Seventeenth Amendment analysis.114
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit grants these cutoff dates—the date from
which permanent appointments will be allowed—considerable discretion,
and a permanent appointment is permissible even for a period lasting
twenty-five months.115 In Lynch v. Illinois State Board of Elections, the
Seventh Circuit adopted the vacancy clause of the Seventeenth Amendment
as the base level of vacancy election rights.116 Relying on Valenti and Rodriguez, the Seventh Circuit held that vacancies could be filled by appointment, even if the appointee would remain for a period of twenty-five
months, lasting the duration of the term.117 The court found numerous benefits to allowing permanent appointments, such as: lessening voter confusion, increasing voter participation, reducing election costs and providing
deemed unconstitutional simply because the burden falls on a specific group of citizens. See
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (finding that a filing fee to get one’s name on
ballot of primary without reasonable alternatives is unconstitutional).
113.
Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 12. Moreover, the Court stated in dicta that the process
of appointment by the fallen incumbent’s political party could be seen as more democratic
than appointment by a Governor. Id. Here, the permanent appointment was made by the
political party rather than the Governor. Id.
114.
Id. at 14.
115.
Lynch v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 682 F.2d 93, 94-95 (7th Cir. 1982). In
Lynch, voters in Chicago challenged the Mayor’s ability to permanently appoint an alderman
in their district if the vacancy arose with less than twenty-eight months left in the term. Id. at
95. The district court had agreed and ordered that a special election be held. Id. On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit noted that the district court likely reached this conclusion because it
applied strict scrutiny analysis. Id. Specifically, it shifted the burden on the defendants to
show that state or municipal interests in postponing an election outweighed the right to vote
for the residents of Chicago. Id. at 95 n.1. In addition, the district court also questioned the
validity of the underlying state and municipal interests. Id. However, the Seventh Circuit
seems to have applied a rational basis test and gives substantial weight to the state’s interests. See id. at 95-97. Although the vacancy was for one of Chicago’s aldermen, the Seventh
Circuit nonetheless applied a Seventeenth Amendment analysis. See id. For additional information on Illinois’ aldermanic system, see City Council, Your Ward and Alderman, CITY
OF CHICAGO, http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/about/council.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2012). Chicago has fifty aldermen who represent certain geographic regions of the city. Id.
Aldermen play a substantial role in local community development. See id.
116.
Lynch, 682 F.2d at 96 (“Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Valenti as being based
on the Seventeenth Amendment. The [c]ourt in Rodriguez, however, expressly adopted the
rationale in Valenti.”).
117.
Id. at 96-97. The relevant statute stated, in pertinent part: “[W]henever a vacancy occurs in any elective municipal office, with at least [twenty-eight] months remaining
in a four-year term . . . the office shall be filled for the remainder of the term at that general
municipal election.” Id. at 94 (quoting 1980 Ill. Laws, P.A. 80-1469, § 4; 1981 Illinois Laws,
P.A. 81-1490, § 2). The presumption from that statute is that if less than twenty-eight
months remain in the term, no special election is needed. See id.

318

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

uniformity in the conduct and administration of elections.118 The court felt
that cut-off periods were also reasonable because states have an interest in
ensuring governmental processes are not disrupted by vacancies.119 A
twenty-five month cut-off was reasonable in this instance because Illinois
had also established this cut-off period for other public offices.120 This decision constituted a “considered legislative judgment” as to the amount of
time remaining in a term that would justify holding a special election.121
Accordingly, Illinois’ statute fell within the “wide latitude” afforded to
states in regards to vacancies under the Seventeenth Amendment.122 Therefore, a twenty-five month appointment lasting the duration of a term does
not violate the Seventeenth Amendment.123
However, where a vacancy occurs in the House of Representatives, a
state must hold a special election, provided there is ample time to conduct a
special election, even if only two months would remain in the term thereafter.124 The Seventh Circuit noted in Jackson v. Ogilvie that even if this special election was held with the next general election on November 3, 1970,
it would still leave approximately two months from the verification of the
special election results to the end of the term on January 3, 1971. This period would not be considered de minimis.125 But, in light of Illinois’ statute
118.
Id. at 97.
119.
Id.
120.
Id. The Illinois Legislature adopted the twenty-eight month cut-off for other
offices, such as park district trustees, library district trustees, school board and community
college board members and township officers. Id.
121.
Lynch, 682 F.2d at 97.
122.
See id.
123.
Id.
124.
Jackson v. Ogilvie, 426 F.2d 1333, 1337 (7th Cir. 1970). In Jackson, the plaintiffs sought an election to fill a vacancy that occurred when their district’s representative
died in August, 1969. Id. at 1334. Illinois statute required at least 162 days to lapse from
when the writ of election is filed to when the election could take place. Id. at 1333-35. The
issue was whether an election was required or whether the period remaining in the term was
“de minimis.” Id. at 1335. In accordance with the statute, the earliest the election could happen was January 23, 1970, which would leave eleven months in the term, or alternatively, if
a special election was done in conjunction with the next general election, there would be
approximately two months left in the term. Id. at 1335, 1337. Illinois argued that the governor had the discretion to forgo a special election when less than a year remained in the term.
Id. at 1335. The district court found no violation of the plaintiffs’ rights because of the short
period of time in which the district would remain unrepresented. Id. The district court opinion was handed down on March 16, 1970, and because the state statute required 162 days
before an election could be held, the four months that remained after an election occurred
was deemed de minimis by the court. Id. at 1334-35.
125.
Id. at 1337 (“We are not prepared to say as a matter of law that representation
from the time the results of the November 3rd election will be determined to January 3, 1971
is de minimis.”); see also Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Taft, 385 F.3d 641, 644
(6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that a state could not choose to forgo special election where five
months would remain in House of Representative term even though special election would

2012]

SPECIAL ELECTION REQUIREMENT

319

that requires 162 days before a special election can be held, if the vacancy
had occurred with 162 days or less left in the term, then it may excuse the
governor’s duty to call for an election.126 This period of time could “truly
be deemed de minimis.”127 States therefore had to conduct a special election
in most instances when a vacancy occurred in the House of Representatives.128
F.

EFFORTS IN CONGRESS TO REQUIRE A SPECIAL ELECTION FOR SENATE
VACANCIES HAVE LOST MOMENTUM

In the aftermath of the 2008 election, both the House of Representatives and the Senate attempted to prevent temporary appointments in the
Senate.129 In the House of Representatives, a bill was proposed that would
require that all special elections occur within ninety days of when a vacancy
is created in the Senate.130 States would still have the discretion to provide
temporary appointments in the meantime, but would be constrained in regards to the timing of the special election.131 This bill was referred to the
be costly and the redistricting, that was already going to take effect for the general elections
in 2002, would be difficult); Fox v. Paterson, 715 F. Supp. 2d 431, 442 (W.D. N.Y. 2010)
(concluding that a writ must be issued to fill a House of Representative seat in New York,
but state has discretion to hold a special election along with next general election, even
though it would leave only two months in term).
126.
Jackson, 426 F.2d at 1336.
127.
Id.
128.
See id. at 1337.
129.
See infra notes 130-132 and accompanying text for the legislative bill that was
proposed in the House of Representatives. See infra notes 133-137 and accompanying text
for the constitutional amendment proposed in the Senate. Both of these proposals were made
in 2009, after the presidential election of 2008, which directly or indirectly resulted in the
largest number of Senate vacancies in Senate history. See supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
130.
Ethical and Legal Elections for Congressional Transitions Act, H.R. 899, 111th
Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111-899 (last
visited Dec. 27, 2010). This bill was proposed by Representative Aaron Schock on February
4, 2009. Id.
131.
Id. § 2(a)(2). States would be given some leeway where the vacancy occurred
close to a general election or if the vacancy occurred between the general election and the
commencement of the new congressional session. Id. § 2(b)(1), (2). As compensation, states
would be reimbursed for up to 50% of the expenses of conducting the special election. Id. §
297(c). However, as the bill currently stands, an argument could be made that such a bill
would also be unconstitutional for infringing on states’ rights to conduct special elections.
While art. I, § 4, cl. 1 of the Constitution allows Congress to supersede states in regulating
the “[t]imes, [p]laces and [m]anner” of elections, this clause only refers to general elections.
See id. § 2(b); U.S. Const. art. 1, § 4, cl. 9. In contrast, states’ powers to regulate special
elections are derived from the Seventeenth Amendment. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (providing language of Seventeenth Amendment and that the special election occurs
“as the legislature may direct”); see also discussion supra Part II.E (explaining that the Supreme Court has stated in Valenti and Rodriguez that states are afforded discretion in regards
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House Committee on House Administration, but no further action has been
taken, and the Bill seems to have lost momentum since then.132
In the Senate, Senator Russell Feingold and Senator David Dreier introduced Senate Bill S.J. Res. 7133 and S.J. Res. 21,134 respectively, which
would amend the constitution to require that “[n]o person shall be a Senator
from a State unless such person has been elected by the people thereof.”135
This proposal was met favorably in a joint hearing before a Senate and
House of Representatives Subcommittee.136 However, when it progressed to
to senate vacancies). In the second paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment, the second
proviso, “as the legislation may direct,” qualifies the word “election” even in its narrowest
interpretation (i.e. the interpretation adopted by Judge). U.S. Const. amend XVII. See also
discussion infra Part III.C (discussing how Judge interprets the Seventeenth Amendment).
Accordingly, states have the authority to control aspects of the special election, and this Bill
would clearly remove that power from the states.
132.
See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/ (go to “Try the Advanced
Search” to find the 111th Congress; then enter name “Ethical and Legal Elections for Congressional Transitions Act” into the search box). There is also little coverage on this Act thus
far. H.R. 899 Ethical and Legal Elections for Congressional Transitions Act, OPEN
CONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h899/show (last visited Dec. 27, 2010)
(“no news coverage found for this bill at this time. This means that this this [sic] bill has not
yet been mentioned on a publicly-searchable news website by either its official number . . .
or title.”). The Committee on House Administration is the committee charged with the oversight of federal elections and considers proposals to amend federal election law. See About,
COMM. ON HOUSE ADMIN., http://cha.house.gov/about (last visited Dec. 27, 2010) for additional information about the House Committee.
133.
See S.J.Res.7 – A Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States Relative to the Election of Senators, OPENCONGRESS,
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-sj7/show (last visited Dec. 27, 2010) for the latest
discussion on the legislation.
134.
See H.J.Res.21 - Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States
Relative
to
the
Election
of
Senators,
OPENCONGRESS,
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-hj21/show (last visited Dec. 27, 2010) for the latest
discussion on the legislation.
135.
See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THOMAS HOME, S.J.RES.7 – Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Relative to the Election of Senators,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:S.J.RES.7: (last visited Dec. 27, 2010); see also
NEALE, supra note 2, at 14.
136.
NEALE, supra note 2, at 14-15. This joint session of the two subcommittees was
held on Jan. 29, 2009, after the 2008 presidential election. Ben Pershing, Should All Senators
be Elected?, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2009), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/capitolbriefing/2009/03/should_all_senators_be_elected.html. The full subcommittee report can be
obtained online. See S.J. Res. 7 and H.J. Res. 21: A Constitutional Amendment Concerning
Senate Vacancies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 14 (2009), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-34_54105.PDF ) [hereinafter Joint
Hearing Report]. The Bill was covered when it was voted on favorably by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution. See Edwin Mora, Senate Panel Okays Ban on Gubernatorial Appointments to Vacant Senate Seats, CNSNEWS (Aug. 20, 2009),
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the entire Committee on the Judiciary in September, 2009, it was not supported by a majority and also seems to have lost momentum since then.137

III.

DISCUSSION

Under established Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent,
states have substantial discretion to conduct special elections and even to
delay the election for twenty-nine months, provided only that the state has
reasonable interests for doing so.138 Temporary appointees can even finish a
term where a state has determined that the impracticalities and costs of a
special election outweigh voters’ right to an elected representative.139 The
only exception is when a vacancy occurs in the House of Representatives;
in that instance, a special election is required because a district would be
unrepresented otherwise.140 This remains the law despite recent attempts in
Congress to otherwise limit the states’ right to make appointments in the
case of Senate vacancies.141

http://www.cnsnews.com/node/52837. This Bill thus made it through the “mark-up” session
and then proceeded to the entire Committee. See Bill Summary and Status: S.J. Res. 7,
LIBRARY
OF
CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/D?d111:7:./list/bss/d111SJ.lst:@@@D&summ2=m& (last visited Dec. 27,
2010); see also Josh Tauberer What Does “Ordered to be Reported with an Amendment in
the
Nature
of
a
Substitute
Favorably”
Mean?,
GOVTRACK
BLOG,
http://www.govtrack.us/blog/2008/09/18/what-does-ordered-to-be-reported-with-anamendment-in-the-nature-of-a-substitute-favorably-mean/ (Sept. 18, 2008) (discussing the
various stages of a Bill).
137.
This bill was met unfavorably by the entire Committee. See Bill Summary and
Status:
S.J.
Res.
7,
LIBRARY
OF
CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/D?d111:7:./list/bss/d111SJ.lst:@@@D&summ2=m& (last visited Dec. 27,
2010); see also Josh Tauberer What Does “Ordered to be Reported with an Amendment in
the
Nature
of
a
Substitute
Favorably”
Mean?,
GOVTRACK
BLOG,
http://www.govtrack.us/blog/2008/09/18/what-does-ordered-to-be-reported-with-anamendment-in-the-nature-of-a-substitute-favorably-mean/ (Sept. 18, 2008) (stating that
“favorably reported” means that a majority of the Committee supports it; conversely, if the
majority of the committee was opposed to it, “they would report it out unfavorably to put
their stamp on it but still not cross ways with leadership.”); see also Joint Hearing Report,
supra note 3, at 2-6 (citing costs to states, not allowing for quick refill in case of terrorist
attack, and the rare large number of vacancies occurring in 2008 that will work themselves
out in the next few senate cycles as reasons not warranting a constitutional amendment).
138.
See supra Part II.E (providing synopsis of case law that assesses states’ vacancy
statutes under Seventeenth Amendment analysis).
139.
See supra Part II.E (discussing how both Rodriguez and Lynch allowed permanent appointments).
140.
See supra Part II.E (explaining how Jackson is the primary exception because it
does not grant deference where a vacancy occurs in the House of Representatives).
141.
See supra Part II.F (supplying the efforts by House of Representatives and Senate to limit states’ discretion to appoint senators have lost momentum).
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However, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Judge went against established Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent when it held that a
special election must always be held under the Seventeenth Amendment.142
Part A first provides background information about the case.143 Part B discusses the district court’s opinion, which found that the Seventeenth
Amendment did not require a special election in this instance.144 Part C
discusses the Seventh Circuit’s decision that closely analyzed the language
of the Seventeenth Amendment to find that a special election was required
but affirmed the district court on other grounds.145 Part D discusses the Seventh Circuit’s amended opinion that explicitly required that Illinois conduct
a special election.146 Finally, Part E discusses the district court’s injunctive
order that established the procedures to be used in conducting the special
election and the expedited verification schedule.147
A.

BACKGROUND TO JUDGE V. QUINN

Illinois is one of thirty-six states that allow the governor to pick a temporary appointment until the next general election.148 Section 5/25-8 of the
Illinois’ Election Code requires that a special election occur in conjunction
with the next general election and that the winner take office once the election is verified.149 Like most of the other “joint election only” states, Illinois
142.
See infra Part III.C & III.D (discussing the Seventh Circuit’s original decision in
Judge v. Quinn which held that the language of the Seventeenth Amendment requires a
special election and the subsequent amended opinion which explicitly required that Illinois
conduct a special election in this instance).
143.
See infra Part III.A (providing factual background as to how the senate vacancy
was created in Illinois in 2008 as well as the Illinois statute that governs senate vacancies).
144.
See infra Part III.B (discussing the district court’s opinion in which the court
utilized language in Valenti, Rodriguez, and Lynch to find that a special election was not
always required).
145.
See infra Part III.C (discussing the Seventh Circuit’s original opinion which
concluded that the language of the Seventeenth Amendment required that special elections
be conducted to fill senate vacancies but nonetheless denying plaintiffs’ relief on other
grounds).
146.
See infra Part III.D (discussing the Seventh Circuit’s one-page amended opinion, which explicitly required Illinois conduct a special election to fill vacant senate seat).
147.
See infra Part III.E (discussing district court’s subsequent injunctive order
which established an expedited election schedule for Illinois to allow the special election to
occur in conjunction with next general election and to verify the results to allow the winner
to take office before the end of the term).
148.
See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 12 (providing a
breakdown of states’ senate vacancy statutes).
149.
10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/25-8 (2010). Illinois’ Election Code provides:
When a vacancy shall occur in the office of United States Senator from
this state, the Governor shall make temporary appointment to fill such
vacancy until the next election of representatives in Congress, at which
time such vacancy shall be filled by election, and the senator so elected
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also allows an appointee to finish the term when the vacancy occurs in the
last one-third of the senate term.150 This is precisely what happened when
Barack Obama resigned from his Senate seat to become President on November 16, 2008,151 leaving two years and forty-eight days left in the senate
term.152 The general election held the week of his resignation was in his
fourth year in office.153 The next general election would be at the end of
Obama’s term.154 In accordance with its Election Code, Illinois had no plan
of holding a special election, and the appointee, Roland Burris, was therefore allowed to serve out the remainder of the term.155
B.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Plaintiffs, Gerald Judge and David Kindler, were voters who
sought an injunctive order requiring Illinois to hold an election to select the
replacement senator.156 They brought suit in the Northern District Court of
Illinois contending that the Illinois Election Code violated the Seventeenth
Amendment because there would be no special election to fill Obama’s
seat.157 To determine if injunctive relief is appropriate, courts assess the
harm that will occur if relief was denied and the likelihood of success on
the merits.158 The district court held that the plaintiffs had a low chance of

Id.

shall take office as soon thereafter as he shall receive his certificate of
election.

150.
Attorney General Memorandum, supra note 9, at *2.
151.
Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 541 (7th Cir. 2010); Mason, supra note 4 (providing details of Obama’s resignation).
152.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 541; Mason, supra note 4 (providing details of Obama’s
resignation).
153.
Barack Obama started his term in January, 2005, and therefore, his term would
end in January, 2011.
154.
The vacancy occurred after the November 2008 elections. See Lynn Sweet,
Obama Resigning Senate Seat As of Sunday, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Nov. 13, 2008, 1:36 PM),
http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2008/11/obama_resigning_senate_seat_as.html. Therefore,
under Illinois law, the special election would occur in conjunction with the next general
election, which was in November 2010. See Kevin Lee, Judge: Special Election Needed to
Replace
Burris,
ILL.
STATEHOUSE
NEWS
(June
17,
2010),
http://illinois.statehousenewsonline.com/3303/judge-special-election-needed-to-replaceburris/. However, this is also the election in which a new senator would be chosen for
Obama’s seat. Id.
155.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 544 (“The State of Illinois appears to agree that this will be
the practical effect of the state's system.”).
156.
Judge v. Quinn, 623 F. Supp. 2d 933, 933 (N.D. Ill. 2009), aff’d, 612 F.3d 537
(7th Cir. 2010).
157.
Id. at 953.
158.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 546. To a large extent, whether or not to grant preliminary
injunction is a public inquiry because harm to the public can be a significant factor in determining if injunctive relief is proper. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
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success on the merits because states had substantial discretion in regards to
special elections in light of Valenti and Rodriguez.159 Moreover, because
the statute at issue in Valenti allowed for a delay of twenty-nine months, the
district court held that a twenty-five months delay in this case was constitutional under Illinois’ statute.160 Therefore, the district court denied the
plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief.161 This case was then appealed to the
Seventh Circuit.162
C.

JUDGE V. QUINN

The Seventh Circuit held that states do not have the discretion to bypass a senate special election even if only two months would remain in the
term after the election.163 While the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court’s analysis of the likelihood of success on the merits, it nonetheless denied injunctive relief because the plaintiffs could not show that they
had been harmed yet because Illinois still had time to conduct a special
election.164
In determining the likelihood of success on the merits, the Seventh
Circuit first separated the vacancy clause of the Seventeenth Amendment
into four parts—the first two parts being the principle clauses, and the last
two being the proviso clauses:165
7, 15 (2008) (involving environmental organizations’ preliminary injunction that was denied
in a case where although harm to marine mammals was possible if Navy used mid-frequency
sonars in the sea, the public’s interest in Navy research and providing realistic training to
Navy sailors).
159.
Judge, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 940 (“The analogy in Rodriguez to Valenti and the
Seventeenth Amendment was not an ‘aside unrelated to the subject matter of the case’ . . . it
played a meaningful role in the Court’s reasoning.” (citation omitted)).
160.
Id. The district court did not even attempt to enumerate on the state’s interests.
Instead, it said the plaintiffs’ claim was foreclosed under Valenti since it created a shorter
delay than twenty-nine months, which was permitted in Valenti. Id.
161.
Id.
162.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 537.
163.
Id. at 554-55.
164.
Id. at 557. Here, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had a strong
likelihood of success on the merits. Id. However, the plaintiffs could not show harm. Id. The
plaintiffs floundered on what relief they sought. Id. The plaintiffs abandoned their position
that the election should be as soon as practical, and instead argued only that Governor Quinn
issue a writ of election that fixes a particular date for the election to fill the vacancy. Id.
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit noted that no harm had occurred yet. Id. There was still time
for Governor Quinn to issue a writ of election setting the date of the general election as the
date for the special election as well. Id.
165.
Id. at 546. No previous court had ever attempted to break down the Seventeenth
Amendment into its four components, and therefore, to some extent, this was a novel determination being undertaken by the Seventh Circuit. See id. However, other cases have discussed principal and proviso clauses, generally. Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 108
(2005) (discussing that the purpose of a proviso is to state a “general, independent rule”);
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[1] When vacancies happen in the representation of any
State in the Senate, [2] the executive authority of such State
shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided
[3] That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the
people fill the vacancies by election [4] as the legislature
may direct.166
The court then proceeded to determine the Seventeenth Amendment’s
vacancy requirements.167 The first principal clause required that a vacancy
occur.168 Here, a vacancy occurred when Obama resigned.169 The second
principle clause170 delegated responsibility as to who must do what when a
vacancy occurs.171 The Seventeenth Amendment required that that the state
executive address the vacancy provision by issuing a writ of election.172
The word “shall” was interpreted as mandatory language; accordingly, the
governor has to issue a writ of election when the vacancy occurs.173 In
reaching this interpretation, the court emphasized the words of Senator
Bristow, the drafter of the Seventeenth Amendment.174 Senator Bristow
used similar language in the Seventeenth Amendment as in Article 1, § 2,
clause 3 of the Constitution—the clause that governed vacancies for the
United States v. Morrow, 266 U.S. 531, 534 (1925) (discussing the purpose of proviso
clauses).
166.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 551 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XVII). The Seventh Circuit proceeded in its analysis with the understanding that the purpose is to give meaning to
all words such that it will “carry into effect the whole purpose of the law.” Id. (quoting Am.
Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 178 F.2d 903, 906-07 (7th Cir. 1949) (quoting White
v. United States, 191 U.S. 545, 551 (1903)).
167.
Id. Most notably, the Seventh Circuit does not place as much emphasis on Valenti as the district court did. Id. The Seventh Circuit stated that Valenti was only summarily
affirmed by the Supreme Court. Id. at 549; see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
784 n.5 (“[T]he precedential effect of a summary affirmance extends no further than ‘the
precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions.’” (quoting, e.g., Illinois
Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182-83 (1979)).
168.
The first principal clause states: “When vacancies happen in the representation
of any State in the Senate.” Judge, 612 F.3d at 546 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XVII).
169.
Id.
170.
The second principal clause states: “[T]he executive authority of such State
shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided.” Id. (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. XVII).
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 546.
174.
Id. (“The drafting history of the Seventeenth Amendment reveals that this was
no accident. Senator Joseph Bristow, who proposed the language that was approved by the
62nd Congress . . . identified this similarity when he explained his proposed amendment to
the Senate.”).
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House of Representatives.175 The Seventh Circuit, therefore, read the second principal clause accordingly.176
The court then analyzed the proviso clauses to determine how they affected the principal clauses.177 The purpose of the first proviso clause178 was
to maintain a state’s representation in the Senate.179 However, the appointment was only until the people could elect a permanent replacement.180 The
court then addressed the second proviso clause,181 framing the issue as
whether it modified the entire second paragraph of the Seventeenth
Amendment or just the immediate antecedent of that final phrase—the word
“election.”182 The court decided that this proviso was best read as a modification of the directly preceding term “election.”183 Accordingly, the legislature can prescribe the “Times, Places and Manner” of special elections, and
also decide to bypass temporary appointments, opting instead to leave the
seat vacant until the special election.184 However, the state could not prevent a special election from occurring.185 The court concluded that the
command set out in the second principal clause—that the governor must
issue a writ of election—could not be controlled by the legislature.186
Therefore, the court held that a special election was always required to fill a

175.
Id.; see also 47 CONG. REC. 1482-83 (May 23, 1911) (statement of Sen.
Bristow) (opining that this vacancy clause utilized similar language to the House of Representatives vacancy clause and that a writ of election was necessary). See supra Part II.B for a
full discussion of the congressional debate and ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment.
When a vacancy occurs in the House of Representatives, the seat remains vacant until a
special election is held. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
176.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 546. (“Both [the clause governing vacancies in the House of
Representatives] and . . . the Seventeenth Amendment . . . command the responsible state
official to call an election in which the people can select a replacement.”).
177.
Id. at 547-48.
178.
The first proviso clause states: “That the legislature of any State may empower
the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by
election.” Id. at 546 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XVII).
179.
Id. at 548.
180.
Id.
181.
The second proviso clause states: “as the legislature may direct.” Judge, 612
F.3d at 546 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XVII).
182.
Id. at 549.
183.
Id. at 550.
184.
Id.
185.
Id.
186.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 553 (“The plaintiffs are correct that neither the proviso of the
Seventeenth Amendment nor the Elections Clause overrides the duty of the state’s executive
to issue a writ of election when a vacancy occurs.”). The Seventh Circuit also takes an extensive look at the purpose and usage of writs of election in history, dating back to King
James II of France in the fifteenth century. Id. at 552.
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senate vacancy, regardless of how much time would remain in the term
after the special election.187
D.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S AMENDED OPINION

Shortly after the Seventh Circuit handed down its decision, Governor
Quinn filed a motion to amend opinion or for a rehearing en banc.188 All of
the judges on the original panel voted to deny rehearing and no judge in
service requested a hearing.189 However, the court did amend its opinion; it
emphasized that the wording of the Seventeenth Amendment required that
Illinois conduct a special election to elect a senator for the remainder of
Obama’s senate term.190 Furthermore, the district court could strike down
any state statute that otherwise prevented the special election from occurring.191 Finally, the results from the special election should be certified as
soon as possible so that the replacement senator could take office promptly
to fill the remaining time in Obama’s term.192 The Senator elected to begin
the six-year term would take office on January 3, 2011, when the 112th
Congressional session begins.193
E.

THE DISTRICT COURT’S INJUNCTIVE ORDER

Pursuant to the Seventh Circuit’s amended opinion, the district court
was charged with determining the appropriate injunctive relief.194 This in187.
Id. at 555 (“So understood, the second paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment establishes a rule for all circumstances: it imposes a duty on state executives to make
sure that an election fills each vacancy; it obliges state legislatures to promulgate rules for
vacancy elections; and it allows for temporary appointments until an election occurs.”).
188.
Judge v. Quinn, No. 09-229, 2010 WL 2853645 (7th Cir. 2010) (amended opinion).
189.
Id.
190.
Id.
191.
Id. This amended opinion was very brief and provided no additional rationale as
to why a special election was required under the Seventeenth Amendment. Id. It only clarified for the district court that it had to establish an expedited schedule for Illinois to conduct
and verify the results of the special election. Id. It had not stated this explicitly in the original
opinion but had denied the Plaintiffs’ relief for failure to show harm. Judge, 612 F.3d 557. It
is also worth noting that Illinois’ statute was not struck down, but the Seventh Circuit held
that the manner in which the State was interpreting the statute was unconstitutional since it
bypassed the requirement for a special election. Id.
192.
Judge, No. 09-229, 2010 WL 2853645 (amended opinion).
193.
Id.
194.
Judge v. Quinn, No. 09 C 1231, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ill. Aug 2, 2010) (order
granting permanent injunction). By this time, Governor Quinn had issued a writ of election
to fill the vacancy at the next general election. Id. slip op. at 2. Since the Seventh Circuit’s
amended opinion, hearings were held on June 23, June 30, July 21, July 26, and July 29,
2010 to determine how the special election should occur. Id. slip op. at 3.
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junctive order established the procedures to be used for the special election
with an awareness of the time left before the election and knowledge that
the results needed to be verified expeditiously to comply with the Seventeenth Amendment.195 The district court first mandated that only the candidates running for the six-year term be eligible for the special election.196
The court then provided an expedited schedule to determine the winner.197
The state’s election authorities had until Friday, Nov. 19, 2010 to count the
votes.198 It then had to transmit these results to the Illinois State Board of
Elections (“ISBE”), which had five calendar days from the date of receipt
of the tallies to verify the results and proclaim a winner.199
IV.

ANALYSIS

Judge requires that a special election be held even where it would
leave only two months in a senate term.200 However, Judge goes against
established Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent as well as the

195.
Id. slip op. at 1.
196.
Id. slip op. at 4. Governor Burris would then file an emergency motion to the
Supreme Court to resolve this issue because he wanted to run for the two months and complete his term but was precluded by the district court’s opinion. See Emergency Application
for a Stay of Enforcement of the Judgment Below Pending the Filing and Disposition of a
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, Judge, 612 F.3d 537 [hereinafter Burris’ Emergency Application for Stay of
Enforcement] (arguing the district court was not authorized to conduct a closed election
which precluded all prospective candidates who were not also running for the six-year term).
Justice Breyer denied Burris’ Request for a Stay of Enforcement but did provide case citations from which the reasons for denial can be inferred. See Lyle Denniston, Burris Plea
Denied, SCOTUS BLOG (Sept. 19, 2010 5:23 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/09/senburris-files-petition/ (providing case citations which stand for the proposition that it would
be impractical to put Burris on the ballot now, that even if it were possible, that it would
disrupt election proceedings, and because the Seventh Circuit should be given additional
time to resolve the dispute). Justice Breyer’s one-page opinion can also be accessed from
this link to SCOTUS BLOG. Id.
197.
Judge v. Quinn, No. 09 C 1231, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2010). There was
no rationale provided as to why the district court structured it this way. Id. It seems to be as a
result of the short amount of time before the election that the district court ordered it this
way. Id.
198.
Id.
199.
Id. However, the court would allow an additional three days for the ISBE to
verify the results if they did not receive the votes by November 19th or if errors or inconsistencies were apparent and could not be resolved within five days. Id. Burris was allowed to
remain in office until the winner of the special election took the oath of office. Id. at slip op.
at 5.
200.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 554-55. See supra Part III.C (discussing Seventh Circuit’s
opinion in Judge).
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legislative history of the Seventeenth Amendment.201 Part A argues that
Judge misinterprets the Seventeenth Amendment.202 Part B argues that
Judge does not place proper weight on the states’ interest in not conducting
a special election.203 Part C argues that Judge fails to grant substantial deference to states’ cut-off periods.204 Part D argues that Judge is erroneous
because it fails to distinguish between the effects of a vacancy in the House
of Representatives and the Senate.205 Finally, Part E argues that Judge is
inconsistent with the legislative history of the Seventeenth Amendment and
how permanent appointments by a governor were not the evil sought to be
avoided by the Amendment.206
A.

JUDGE MISINTERPRETS THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT

The Seventh Circuit misinterprets the Seventeenth Amendment because it misconstrues the final proviso, “as the legislature may direct,” as
qualifying only the immediately preceding word “election” as opposed to
the entire second paragraph of the Amendment.207 The Supreme Court read
201.
See infra Parts IV.A-F (providing five ways in which Judge is inconsistent with
established Supreme Court or Seventh Circuit precedent, as well as the legislative history of
the Seventeenth Amendment).
202.
See infra Part IV.A (arguing that the Supreme Court in Valenti and Rodriguez
read the language “as the legislature may direct” as a modification on the entire second
paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment whereas the Seventh Circuit in Judge read it as a
modification of only the immediately preceding word “election”).
203.
See infra Part IV.B (arguing that while Valenti, Rodriguez, and Lynch placed
proper weight to the state’s interests in not conducting a special election, the Seventh Circuit
does not place any weight on Illinois’ interests in Judge).
204.
See infra Part IV.C (arguing that while Jackson gave deference to states’ statutes in regards to how much time is required to conduct an election, the Seventh Circuit in
Judge merely sets aside all Illinois statutes that otherwise stand in the way of a special election).
205.
See infra Part IV.D (arguing that while Valenti and Jackson read the two vacancy clauses differently in light of the different harms that occur when a vacancy occurs in
the Senate as compared to the House of Representatives, Judge reads the two clauses analogously).
206.
See infra Part IV.F (arguing that permanent appointments by a governor were
not foreclosed by the legislative history nor the evil sought to be avoided by the Framers of
the Seventeenth Amendment).
207.
Compare Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 85, 867-68 (W.D. N.Y. 1969)
and Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 14 (1892) and Lynch v. Ill. State
Bd. of Elections, 682 F.2d 93, 94 (7th Cir. 1982), with Judge, 612 F.3d at 554-55. Constitutional Law scholars have also disagreed as to whether the proviso “as the legislature directs”
should modify the language in the principal clauses or only the immediately preceding word
“election.” This debate pertained to Wyoming’s statute that required the governor to appoint
one of three recommended candidates provided to them by the political party which the
fallen incumbent represented. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111 (requiring governor to
appoint one of three candidates provided by the fallen incumbent’s political party). If the
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this language as a modification on the entire second paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment.208 Accordingly, under Valenti, a state legislature
could allow an appointee to serve for an extended period of time, or even
conclude that a special election would not be needed if the state’s interests
outweighed the harm to voters, provided only that those interests were reasonable.209 New York was allowed to keep their temporary appointee for a
period of twenty-nine months because the state had substantial interests at
stake.210 The court clarified that a statute would be problematic only if it
allowed for an appointee to serve out the remainder of a senate term “regardless of its length.”211 But states with statutes like Illinois do not always
allow an appointee to serve out the remainder of a term.212 For example, if a
vacancy occurs in the first two-thirds of a senate term, Illinois will not allow a permanent appointment.213 A permanent appointment is only possible
when the vacancy occurs in the final one-third of the senate term.214 Valenti
therefore envisioned scenarios where appointments would be permanent.215
proviso “as the legislature directs” applied to the entire second paragraph of the Seventeenth
Amendment, then states would be allowed to require a governor to appoint from a list of
candidates; alternatively, if the proviso only applied to the immediately preceding word
“election,” then a legislature could not limit the governor’s choice but could only control the
“Times, Places and Manner” of the special election. Vikram Amar argued that the legislature
could only empower the state executive to make an appointment; it could not constrain the
governor’s power by requiring the governor to pick from a list of candidates. See Vikram
David Amar, Are Statutes Constraining Gubernatorial Power to Make Temporary Appointments to the United States Senate Constitutional Under the Seventeenth Amendment?, 35
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727, 729-33 (2008). Sanford Levinson disagreed, arguing that such
an interpretation was reasonable and not a frivolous reading of the Seventeenth Amendment.
See Sanford Levinson, Political Party and Senatorial Succession: A Response to Vikram
Amar on how Best to Interpret the Seventeenth Amendment, 35 HASTINGS L.Q. 713, 721
(2008) (“One’s ultimate answer might well depend on the degree to which one believes that
constitutional drafters are like poets or novelists like Ernest Hemingway in their concern for
the placement and grammatical implications of every single word . . . The Constitution is rife
with badly or confusingly drafted language.”).
208.
Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 864.
209.
Id.
210.
Id. at 867-68.
211.
Id. at 856.
212.
Id. Where the vacancy occurs in the first four years (with ample time allowing a
state to conduct a special election with the fourth year general election), the special election
is held with the next general election. See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/25-8 (2010) (requiring the special election occur with the next general election). It is only after the fourth year
general election passes that the statute’s practical effect is to allow for permanent appointments. Id.
213.
Id. Illinois statutes, like other states’ statutes, require that the special election
occur in conjunction with the next general election. Id. So, for example, if a vacancy occurs
in the first year, a special election would be held with the general election in the second year
of the term.
214.
Id. This is likely a legislative decision by the states that there would not be any
significant period of time left in the term to justify holding the special election. See Eric
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That the Supreme Court envisioned permanent appointments in certain
scenarios is clear from the aftermath of Valenti and the subsequent affirmation of Valenti in Rodriguez.216 In Valenti, while a special election was initially scheduled, it was never actually conducted and the appointee, Charles
Goodell, was allowed to finish the term.217 Rodriguez then held that a permanent appointment lasting fifteen months in the state legislature was constitutional under a Seventeenth Amendment analysis.218 When the Rodriguez Court revisited Valenti thirteen years later, it is reasonable to assume
Zorn, A Special Election to Pick a Lame Duck? The Idea Just Might Fly, CHI. TRIB. (July 2,
2010), http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/2010/07/election.html. This
is clear from Illinois’ example since Mark Kirk, the winner of the special election, took
office in early December, leaving less than one month in the term. See Brian O’Connor,
Illinois Republican Senator Mark Kirk to be Sworn In Monday, RED DOG REPORT (Nov. 27,
2010, 9:13 AM), http://reddogreport.com/2010/11/illinois-republican-senator-mark-kirk-tobe-sworn-in-monday/. Allowing permanent appointments if a vacancy occurs in the final
one-third of a senate term is the interpretation most states have given to their statutes. For
example, in the 193 vacancies that have occurred between the ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment and the election of President Obama, twenty-seven of those vacancies were
filled by appointees who served the remainder of the senate term in question. Judge v.
Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 556 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that this was the practical effect of these
states’ statutes when the vacancy occurs and the next general election would be in the year
immediately preceding the term’s end). States’ statutes would be problematic under Valenti,
if for example, a vacancy occurred in the first one-third of the term, and nonetheless, the
states allowed an appointee to serve out the remainder of the term. Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at
856. But none of the states have enacted statutes to this effect. Such an interpretation of the
Seventeenth Amendment would be unreasonable, as the court opined in Valenti. Id. (“We
would have difficulty, for example, squaring the word ‘temporary’ with a statute providing
that the Governor’s appointee is to serve out the remainder of a term regardless of its
length.”).
215.
Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 856.
216.
See supra text accompanying note 109. In the aftermath of Valenti, the appointee, Charles Goodell was allowed to serve out the remainder of the term. Id.
217.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 556 (“Notably, there was never an election to fill the vacancy
that was the subject of Valenti v. Rockefeller”); see Biography of Charles Ellsworth Goodell,
BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=G000282 (last visited Dec. 23,
2010) (noting that Goodell “served from September 10, 1968, to January 3, 1971 . . .”). It
seems that the state at least intended to conduct the special election with the next general
election. Valenti, 292 F. Supp 885 (Frankel, J., dissenting) (arguing that the creation of the
vacancy to November, 30, 1969, which would be the end of the appointee’s term as announced by the Governor of New York, was too long). The dissent, therefore, understood the
appointment to still be temporary. Id. However, it is not clear that the majority limited its
opinion to only a term lasting until November 30, 1969, but instead used much broader
language. See discussion supra Part II.E (discussing Valenti).
218.
Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 11 (1892) (“[T]he fact that
the Seventeenth Amendment permits a state, if it chooses, to forgo a special election in favor
of a temporary appointment to the United States Senate suggests that a state is not constitutionally prohibited from exercising similar latitude with regard to vacancies in its own legislature.”).
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the Supreme Court knew no special election was ever held after the Court’s
decision in Valenti.219 It nonetheless affirmed Valenti and allowed for the
permanent appointment in Rodriguez.220
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the second proviso to modify only the preceding term “election.”221 Accordingly, the legislature could
not stop a governor from filing a writ of election nor could the legislature
conclude that a special election was not needed under certain circumstances.222 The outcomes of these three cases display this difference in interpretation: no special election was held after Valenti and Rodriguez and
the temporary appointees finished the remainder of the term.223 However,
after Judge, a special election was required to fill the remaining time period
in Obama’s term.224 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the
language “as the legislature may direct” is erroneous.225
B.

JUDGE DOES NOT PLACE PROPER WEIGHT ON ILLINOIS’ INTERESTS IN
NOT CONDUCTING A SPECIAL ELECTION

Moreover, the Seventh Circuit in Judge did not place any weight on
the states’ interests.226 This runs apposite to what the Supreme Court had
done in Valenti and Rodriguez.227 The Supreme Court in Valenti and Rodriguez concluded that states had the option of bypassing special elections if
they felt their interests outweighed the voters’ right to elected representation.228 In Valenti, the Court accepted the state’s arguments that waiting
until the next general election was reasonable because it maximized voter

219.
Id. at 10-12. Had the Court in Rodriguez not agreed with the eventual outcome
in Valenti—namely, New York’s decision not to conduct a special election, it likely would
have expressed disapproval in Rodriguez. Instead, it expressly affirmed Valenti and discussed it at length. Id.
220.
Id. at 11 (discussing the importance of the holding in Valenti).
221.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 550.
222.
Id. at 552.
223.
Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 856 (W.D.N.Y. 1968) (Charles
Goodell served the remainder of the term in Valenti); Judge, 612 F.3d at 556. In addition, the
appointee in Rodriguez served for approximately fifteen months lasting the duration of the
term. Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 11.
224.
See Pearson, supra note 17; Davey, supra note 17 (illustrating newspaper articles that confirm two senate races will be on the November 2 ballot).
225.
Compare Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 867-68, Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 14, with
Judge, 612 F.3d at 554-55.
226.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 554-55 (not discussing the substantial odds of voter confusion or inconvenience that would result to conduct a special election in approximately three
months).
227.
Compare Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 868, Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 13, with Judge,
612 F.3d at 554-55.
228.
Valenti 292 F. Supp. at 855-62; Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 12.
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turnout and ensured that the special election was not conducted in haste.229
Similarly, in Rodriguez, the Court opined that a permanent appointee furthered the state’s legitimate interest in ensuring vacancies are filled
promptly without the expense and inconvenience of a special election.230
But Illinois argued that the state had an interest in preventing the voter confusion that would inevitably result from expeditiously conducting a joint
election.231 Furthermore, this interest outweighed the voters’ right to have
an elected representative for the final one month of the term.232 However,
the Seventh Circuit did not assign proper weight to Illinois’ interest in preventing voter confusion.233 Illinois, like the state of New York in Valenti,
had a history of voter confusion that substantiated their claim.234 When Illinois held a special election in conjunction with a general election for the
House of Representative vacancy at issue in Jackson, more people voted on
the first ballot but left the second ballot blank.235 Illinois, therefore, did not
want to conduct a special election in haste because it would have jeopardized the integrity of both the special election as well as the general election.236 Under the reasoning of Valenti and Lynch, these state interests, such
as preventing voter confusion, and the states’ interest in not conducting an
election in haste, should have outweighed the voters’ right to elected representation for the final one or two months of a senate term.237 Judge nonetheless held that permanent appointments were unconstitutional and a special election was required.238

229.
Valenti, 292 F. Supp. 855-62.
230.
Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 12.
231.
Motion to Amend Opinion or, in the Alternative, Petition for Rehearing en
banc, of Defendant-Appellee Patrick J. Quinn, Governor of the State of Illinois, at 9-10, 612
F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-CV-1231) [hereinafter State’s Motion to Amend Opinion].
232.
Id.
233.
Had the Seventh Circuit actually balanced the interests, it is likely Illinois’
interest in preventing voter confusion would outweigh the plaintiffs’ interest in having an
elected representative for the final two months of the term. See Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364-65 (1997) (holding that states can prevent candidates
from appearing as representatives from more than one party on a ballot because the state has
an important interest in preventing voter confusion); American Party of Texas v. Hainsworth, 415 U.S. 767, 783 (1974) (preventing voter confusion is a “compelling” state interest).
234.
State’s Motion to Amend Opinion, supra note 231, at 9-10.
235.
Id. It is not clear why voters left the second ballot left, it may have been because
they thought it was a misprint. In the aftermath of Jackson, a special election was held in
conjunction with the general election for the House of Representatives’ seat. Substantial
voter confusion was present. Id.
236.
See id.
237.
Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 85, 861-64 (W.D. N.Y. 1969); Lynch v. Ill.
State Bd. of Elections, 682 F.2d 93, 94-95 (7th Cir. 1982),
238.
Judge v. Quinn, 387 F. App’x 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (amended opinion).
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JUDGE DOES NOT GRANT DEFERENCE TO THE STATE’S DECISION NOT
TO CONDUCT A SPECIAL ELECTION IN THE FINAL ONE-THIRD OF THE
SENATE TERM

Finally, Judge does not grant deference to Illinois’ decision not to
conduct a special election when the senate vacancy occurred in the last onethird of the term.239 The Seventh Circuit in Lynch concluded that the Seventeenth Amendment allowed an appointee to remain in office for a period of
twenty-five months running through the duration of the term.240 However,
the Seventh Circuit in Judge held that an appointment for approximately
twenty-five months running through the duration of the term was unconstitutional.241 In addition, Lynch found cut-offs to be reasonable because the
government had an interest in ensuring governmental processes were not
disrupted by vacancies.242 Similarly, in Judge, an argument was made that
Illinois had an interest in ensuring consistency through the end of nowPresident Obama’s Senate term.243 The appointee, Roland Burris, had already served for approximately two years but would not have the opportunity to finish the term.244 Instead, the elected representative will serve for
the final one month of the term.245 Finally, Lynch found a twenty-eight
month cut-off to be reasonable because Illinois had specifically adopted the
twenty-eight month cut-off for vacancies in other public offices as well.246
This cut-off was a “considered legislative judgment” as to the amount of
time remaining in a term that would justify holding a special election.247
Similarly, in Judge, the court held that Illinois’ decision not to conduct a
special election in the final one-third of the senate term was a calculated
decision because Illinois felt the inconvenience and probability of confusion did not outweigh voters’ right to a represented Senator for the final
239.
Judge, 612 F. 3d at 550-51.
240.
Lynch, 682 F.2d at 97.
241.
Judge, 612 F. 3d at 550-51.
242.
Lynch, 682 F.2d at 97.
243.
Burris argued that voters may have different preferences for the two elections
and allow him to finish the remainder of the term. Moreover, the Democratic Party in Illinois
could choose a different candidate for the special and regular elections. “After all, important
legislation is set for the concluding session, and the Democratic Party of Illinois might wish
to have the Senator who is already in Washington and well steeped in the pending issues to
advocate for the people of Illinois.” Burris’ Emergency Application for Stay of Enforcement,
supra note 196, at 17.
244.
The district court decided that only the candidates running for the six-year term
would be allowed to run for the special election. Judge v. Quinn, No 09 C 1231, slip op. at 1
(order granting injunctive relief). This precluded Burris because he did not run for the sixyear term. See Burris Won’t Be on Either Senate Ballot, ABC7 NEWS CHI. (Aug. 4, 2010),
http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/politics&id=7589638.
245.
Id.
246.
Lynch, 682 F.2d at 97.
247.
Id.
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month of the term that would remain after verification of the results.248
However, Judge did not grant the “wide latitude” opined of in Lynch, and
therefore, did not allow a permanent appointment in Judge.249 Instead, the
Seventh Circuit’s amended opinion stated that any state statute standing in
the way of a special election would be struck down.250
D.

JUDGE FAILS TO DISTINGUISH THE HARMS THAT OCCUR WHEN A
VACANCY IS CREATED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AS
COMPARED TO THE SENATE

Judge does not adequately address the differences between vacancies
in the Senate and the House of Representatives.251 In Judge, the Seventh
Circuit opined that the vacancy clause should be read analogous to the vacancy clause that governs the House of Representatives because the wording in the two clauses was identical.252 However, in Valenti, the Supreme
Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the vacancy provision of the
Seventeenth Amendment should be read analogous to the vacancy provision that applies to the House of Representatives.253 The reason for treating
the two vacancy provisions differently is because temporary appointments
are not allowed in the House of Representatives; consequently, vacancies
persist until a special election is held to fill the seat.254 Utilizing Valenti, the
Seventh Circuit in Jackson stated that an election had to be held to fill a
U.S. House of Representative seat even though only two months would
remain in the term after the election.255 This period was not de minimis because without the special election, a particular district would go completely
unrepresented for that time period.256 However, the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on Jackson in Judge was misplaced because those same harms were
248.
The State argued that the time period between the verification of the election
results to January 3rd was de minimis because the Senate is rarely in session, and this was
outweighed by the probability of voter confusion, and the fact that by requiring an expedited
challenge, it would not grant parties a right to challenge the results. State’s Motion to
Amend Opinion at 6-12, Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-CV-1231).
249.
Lynch, 682 F.2d at 97.
250.
Judge v. Quinn, 387 F. App’x 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (amended opinion).
251.
See Judge, 612 F.3d at 545-47.
252.
Id. at 547. The Seventh Circuit reached this decision primarily because Senator
Bristow utilized similar language in the Seventeenth Amendment as was already present in
Article I of the Constitution governing House of Representative vacancies. Id. The Seventh
Circuit then opined that it could not find a reason to read the two clauses differently. Id.
253.
Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 862-63 (W.D.N.Y. 1968).
254.
Id. at 863.
255.
Jackson v. Ogilvie, 426 F.2d 1333, 1337 (7th Cir. 1970).
256.
In Judge, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court’s holding that the
short time of not being represented was de minimis and therefore, no special election was
needed. Judge, 612 F.3d at 545-47. The Seventh Circuit stated that this period was not de
minimis. Id. at 1337.
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not present when the Senate vacancy occurred in Illinois.257 The people of
Illinois were already represented by Richard Durbin, the other elected senator from Illinois.258 Illinois was also being represented by the temporary
appointee—Roland Burris.259 Illinois was not unrepresented in the case of a
Senate vacancy, as it was in Jackson, when a vacancy occurred in the
House of Representatives.260 The harm discussed in Valenti and Jackson
would not have come to pass in Judge.261 Had the Seventh Circuit recognized this, a special election likely would not have been required in the
Seventh Circuit’s amended opinion.262
E.

JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY REQUIRES ILLINOIS TO CONDUCT A SPECIAL
ELECTION BY SETTING ASIDE ITS ELECTION CODE

Judge is erroneous because it requires that Illinois conduct a special
election by setting aside its Election Code.263 The Jackson court stated that
if a vacancy occurred within the time period required to conduct an election, a special election need not be held because that time period could
“truly be deemed de minimis.”264 In that case, an Illinois statute required
162 days to lapse from when the writ of election is filed to when the election can take place.265 However, a similar argument fell on deaf ears when it
was brought up by Illinois in Judge.266 Under Illinois’ Election Code, at
least four-and-a-half months are required to conduct even an abridged spe-

257.
258.

Compare Jackson, 426 F.2d at 1336-37, with Judge, 612 F.3d at 545-47, 555.
Durbin has been serving on the Senate since 1996. UNITED STATES SENATE
BIOGRAPHIES
111TH
CONGRESS,
http://senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/three_column_table/Senators.htm (last visited Dec.
28, 2010) (click on particular class to access Senators’ Biographies). Durbin was also recently rated as one of the top 10 Senators by Time Magazine. See Massimo Calabresi &
Perry Bacon Jr., America’s 10 Best Senators, TIME (Apr. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1184028,00.html.
259.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 537. See Deanna Bellandi, Roland Burris: Blagojevich Appoints Former Attorney General to Obama’s Seat, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 30, 2008),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/12/30/blagojevich-to-appoint-ro_n_154240.html.
260.
Jackson, 426 F.2d at 1336-37.
261.
Compare Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 857-59, with Jackson, 426 F.2d at 1336-37
with Judge, 612 F.3d at 545-47, 555.
262.
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit draws a lot of support for its holding from Jackson
but makes no attempt to distinguish between the two. See Judge, 612 F.3d 545-47, 555.
263.
Judge v. Quinn, 387 F. App’x 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (amended opinion) (requiring
that all Illinois statute that prevent the special election be set aside).
264.
Jackson, 426 F.2d at 1336.
265.
Id. at 1334.
266.
State’s Motion to Amend Opinion at 9-10, 612 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing
voter confusion, among other things, as reason why special election should not be required).
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cial election.267 But Illinois only conclusively learned of this special election requirement when the July 22, 2010 amended opinion explicitly stated
that a special election would be required—three-and-a-half months before
the general election in November.268 Under Jackson, therefore, Illinois
should not have had to schedule the elections together because the statutes
required additional time to conduct a proper election.269 Thus, while the
Seventh Circuit in Jackson respected state statutes that set out how many
days were required before a special election could be held, the Seventh Circuit in Judge ordered that all state statutes that conflicted with the special
election be set aside by the district court.270 Therefore, Judge is inconsistent
with a combined reading of Valenti and Jackson.271
F.

JUDGE’S REQUIREMENT FOR A SPECIAL ELECTION IS INCONSISTENT
WITH THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT
NOR WAS IT THE EVIL SOUGHT TO BE PREVENTED BY ITS FRAMERS

A careful look into the pre-amendment Constitution, the congressional
debate on the Seventeenth Amendment and the underlying purposes of ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment show that Judge imposes nothing
more than an empty formality and a substantial burden upon the states.272
267.
A proper election actually required seven-and-one-half months but an expedited
schedule could be conducted in four-and-one-half months. Id. at 13-14 (citing various Illinois statutes in the Election Code and the timeline). Even for a House seat, which requires an
election in only one district, Illinois requires 115 days. Id. at 14.
268.
The district court could have granted the injunctive relief after the Seventh
Circuit’s initial decision. However, the district court decided to wait until a rehearing as filed
by the State to clarify certain issues before any type of relief was entered by the district
court. Transcript of Proceedings Before the District Court at 21, Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d
537 (2010) (No. 09-C-1231) (“What I am doing now is shifting gears a little bit and myself
asking for some clarification . . . The briefs should go to the Court of Appeals because that’s
where we are going to get the answer on this . . .”).
269.
Jackson, 426 F.2d at 1335 (“Such provisions would render it useless for the
Governor to issue a writ of election where the vacancy occurred 162 days or less before the
end of a term.”). Also, the Supreme Court in Valenti had opined that it did not want to force
the city of New York to conduct an expedited or abridged special election because State
Legislatures were afraid of “boss dominated” elections where primaries were not held. Valenti, 292 F. Supp. 858.
270.
Judge v. Quinn, 387 F. App’x 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (amended opinion) (opining
that a district court order could disregard provisions of state law that otherwise might ordinarily apply to cause delay or prevent the election from occurring).
271.
Compare Valenti, 292 F. Supp. at 857-59, and Jackson, 426 F.2d at 1336-37,
with Judge, 612 F.3d at 545-47, 555.
272.
See discussion supra Part II.A & II.B for background information on the original Constitution and the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. It can hardly be said
that the framers would allow a twenty-nine month delay in circumstances such as Valenti,
but not allow a twenty-five month vacancy in Judge simply because of the fact that the latter
vacancy would be until the end of the term.
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Judge requires that States conduct elections with almost no regard to how
much time would remain in the term after the special election.273 A close
reading of Judge indicates that a special election is always required to fill a
senate vacancy.274 Presumably, even if a special election cannot be held
with the general election in the year preceding the term’s end, Judge would
nonetheless require that a special election occur at the end of November or
maybe even in December.275 That is because the Seventh Circuit emphasized the Seventeenth Amendment’s “requirement” that a state governor
issue the writ of election.276 In reaching this conclusion, the court placed
substantial weight on the words of Senator Bristow, the drafter of the Seventeenth Amendment, who had intentionally used identical language in the
Seventeenth Amendment as that found in the House of Representatives’
vacancy clause.277 The court found no reason to treat the Senate and House
of Representative clauses differently.278
However, the Seventh Circuit’s reading of Senator Bristow’s statements is only a partial reading because it does not account for Senator
Bristow’s intentional use of the appointment powers language of the preSeventeenth Amendment Constitution.279 Senator Bristow clarified that he
did not want to change the existing framework of the pre-amendment Constitution in regards to the appointment powers.280 Under the pre273.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 541 (noting that the language of the Seventeenth Amendment
“commands” the state’s executive to issue the writ of election).
274.
The Seventh Circuit did not limit its holding to say that Illinois had to conduct a
special election only because there was already a general election scheduled. Instead, the
second principal clause commands the governor to issue a writ of election to fill a vacancy.
See supra notes 170-176 and accompanying text. In addition, the final proviso, “as the legislature may direct,” only applies to the immediately preceding word “election.” Accordingly,
the legislature did not have the discretion to determine that no special election would be
required. See supra notes 181-187 and accompanying text.
275.
See supra notes 170-187 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit does not
actually discuss when a de minimis period would be, but presumably, the Seventh Circuit
knew only a month would remain in the term after verification of the results. In addition, the
State also had argued that this final month is characterized by infrequent sessions since it
was the holiday season. See State’s Motion to Amend Opinion at 8, 612 F.3d 537 (7th Cir.
2010) (“[T]he Senate is frequently out of session, convening only for a few days when it
convenes at all.”). The State also provided information that on average, the Senate meets for
eleven days in the month of December. Id.
276.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 548 (opining that Sen. Bristow intended to adopt the precise
language of the vacancy clause that governs the House of Representatives).
277.
Id.
278.
Id.
279.
47 CONG. REC. 1483 (1911) (statement of Sen. Joseph Bristow) (“That is practically the same provision which now exists in the case of such a vacancy. The governor of the
State may appoint a Senator until the legislature elects.”).
280.
Id.; 155 CONG. REC. S2068 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2009) (statement of Sen. Russ
Feingold), available at http://feingold.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=307525 (“These cases have
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Seventeenth Amendment Constitution, an appointment would last until the
“next meeting of the Legislature,” at which point, a new Senator would be
chosen.281 The state legislatures met only once a year.282 Consequently,
where the legislature’s next meeting was not before the end of the term, an
appointee would finish out the term because the legislature was not required
to conduct a special session to pick the next Senator.283
There is only one reading of the Seventeenth Amendment that reconciles both Senator Bristow’s use of the House of Representatives’ vacancy
clause and the pre-Seventeenth Amendment appointment powers.284 If the
vacancy occurs with ample time before the next general election in the year
simply confirmed my longstanding view that Senate appointments by state governors are an
unfortunate relic of the pre-17th Amendment era.”).
281.
“[I]f Vacancies happen by Resignation or otherwise during the Recess of the
Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the
next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.” U.S. CONST. art I, §
3, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
282.
Edmund Randolph of the Detail Committee opined that temporary appointments
were necessary because the Legislature met only once a year and such appointments prevented chasms in the Senate. CREATION OF THE SENATE: FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION PHILADELPHIA, S. DOC. NO. 100-7, at 43 (1937), available at
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SchulzCreationSenate.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 29, 2010). This same argument would be applicable here insofar as requiring an
election for the final month of a term would lead to “inconvenient chasms” insofar as the
representation would be inconsistent. Id. The possibility of permanent appointments in the
Senate was understood as a possibility. See 1 THOMAS HART BENTON, THIRTY YEARS’ VIEW
56 (London, Appleton & Co. 1856) (“The election was the regular mode of the
[C]onstitution, and was not to be superseded by an appointment in any case in which the
legislature could act.”) (emphasis added). Because state legislatures typically met only once
a year, and no special session was required when a vacancy occurred, it was possible for an
appointee to serve out the remainder of a senate term.
283.
CREATION OF THE SENATE: FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION PHILADELPHIA, S. DOC. NO. 100-7, at 43 (1937), available at
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SchulzCreationSenate.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 29, 2010) However, once the legislature had convened for its normal session, an
appointee could no longer finish its term. See BENTON, supra note 282, at 56 (citing multiple
cases where the Senate no longer accepted appointments because the legislatures in those
states had convened). This decision not to require a special session by the legislature to pick
a replacement may reflect the belief that because a year or less remained in the Senate term,
the legislature’s interest in not convening for a special session outweighed the state’s interest
in a properly appointed senator, although, as mentioned in Part II, debate on the clause is
scarce.
284.
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 37 (Princeton Univ. Press 1997) (reasoning that words and phrases of the Constitution should be given “an expansive rather than narrow interpretation—though not an interpretation that the language will not bear”). Here, while Senator Bristow’s adoption of language contained in both the pre-Seventeenth Amendment Constitution as well as the vacancy clause that governs the House of Representatives seems contradictory at first glance,
they can be reconciled in a reasonable manner.
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preceding the term’s end, then states must, at the latest, hold a special election in conjunction with the general election.285 However, an appointment
should be permanent where the final election immediately preceding the
term’s end has passed, or where the vacancy occurs so close to the general
election that it would be impractical for the state to conduct the special
election.286 The burdens at issue are analogous; legislatures were not burdened by a requirement that they convene for a special session under the
pre-Seventeenth Amendment Constitution.287 Similarly, states should not be
burdened by having to conduct a special election where adequate time is not
available to do so.288 Therefore, because permanent appointments were allowed under the pre-Seventeenth Amendment Constitution in limited circumstances, Senator Bristow’s explicit adoption of the pre-amendment appointment powers suggests that he approved of permanent appointments
under the proposed Seventeenth Amendment as well.289 Accordingly, in
circumstances like Judge, where Illinois can no longer conduct a special
election without substantial burden or by setting aside much of its election
procedures, the Seventh Circuit should have allowed the appointment to be
permanent.290
285.
This conclusion is drawn from Senator Bristow’s words in the congressional
session that it was required for a governor to issue the writ of election and order that an
election take place. 47 CONG. REC. 1483 (1911) (Statement of Sen. Joseph Bristow) (“That
is, I use exactly the same language in directing the governor to call special elections for the
election of Senators to fill vacancies that is used in the Constitution in directing him to issue
writs of election to fill vacancies in the House of Representatives.”).
286.
This conclusion is drawn from Senator Bristow’s words in the Congressional
Session that the appointment powers from the pre-Seventeenth Amendment Constitution
carried over. Id. (“That is practically the same provision which now exists in the case of such
a vacancy. The governor of the state may appoint a Senator until the legislature elects.”).
287.
See U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
288.
For example, in the aftermath of Judge, Illinois had to set aside many of its
election statutes and determine how to conduct an expedited election. Judge v. Quinn, No.
09-229, 387 Fed. App’x 629 (7th Cir. 2010), 2010 WL 2853645 (amended opinion) (opining
Illinois must set aside its election law statutes to comport with the Seventeenth Amendment); Judge v. Quinn, No 09 C 1231, slip op. at 1-4 (N.D. Ill. Aug 2, 2010) (establishing
new guidelines for upcoming expedited special election). This burden to determine a replacement is akin to requiring the legislature to convene in a special session just because the
next regular meeting of the legislature would be after the particular Senate term would have
ended. There is nothing in the legislative records to suggest Senator Bristow intended such
inconvenience; but rather, he wanted to keep the appointment system of the pre-Seventeenth
Amendment Constitution intact. This presumably included the possibility of permanent
appointments in certain circumstances.
289.
Thus, Senator Bristow’s adoption of the pre-Seventeenth Amendment appointment powers along with the requirement that a writ of election be filed when a vacancy
occurs can be reconciled with this interpretation.
290.
Illinois only had three-and-one-half months to arrange the election because it
only found out about this requirement in the amended opinion. Illinois likely would not have
had an excuse if they had effectively known from the time the vacancy occurred that a spe-
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Moreover, curtailing a governor’s appointment powers was not the
evil sought to be prevented by the Seventeenth Amendment.291 The evils
that led to the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment were associated
with the legislature picking Senators, such as corruption, bribery, and political deadlocks that prevented the state legislatures from handling other
pertinent state matters.292 Nothing in the legislative history of the Seventeenth Amendment implies that the Framers sought to curtail the Executive’s appointment powers, but only those of the State Legislature.293 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s determination that the Seventeenth Amendment
precluded a governor from making a permanent appointment in extenuating
circumstances is also not supported by the legislative history of the Seventeenth Amendment.294
V.

IMPACT

Most recently, The Supreme Court recently denied the writ of certiorari; this means that the ruling in Judge v. Quinn stands.295 Also, Judge
cial election would be required. Instead, Illinois read its statute just like multiple states had
done before it, without any constitutional challenges.
291.
See supra Part I.B (nothing in the legislative history of the Seventeenth
Amendment would imply that governors’ right to pick a senator was problematic). A governor’s power is curtailed because when the results of a special election are certified, the temporary appointee is no longer authorized by the Seventeenth Amendment to serve the office.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII § 2 (“[A]ny State may empower the executive thereof to make
temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may
direct.”) (emphasis added)). In addition, the Seventeenth Amendment was not necessarily
passed because voters hoped to make the system more efficient; it was only to prevent the
problems associated with state legislators picking senators. See Haynes, Changing Senate,
supra note 52, at 231 (“[T]he Seventeenth Amendment arose far more from observation of
the influence of the legislative election of Senators . . . than from optimistic assurance that
the personnel or efficiency of the Senate would be notably improved by popular election.”).
292.
See supra Part II.B.
293.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text (noting that statements of various
senators preceding the Seventeenth Amendment showed state legislatures had gotten corrupt
and could not be trusted with picking senators). Nothing in these records suggests governors
could not be trusted to make appointments either.
294.
Had the Seventh Circuit interpreted the legislative history correctly, it likely
would not have had an issue with Burris serving the remainder of the term because there was
no evil to be prevented by allowing an appointee to serve out the remainder of the term. See
discussion supra Part II.B (providing purposes of the Seventeenth Amendment).
295.
The petition for review was denied on June 6, 2011. Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d
537 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, Quinn v. Judge, 121 S. Ct. 2958 (2011), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-821.htm. A thorough
analysis of whether or not the Supreme Court should have accepted this case is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, it is generally known that less than one percent of cases are
actually accepted by the Supreme Court. See THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON
APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 4 (West 1994). Moreover, in recent
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cannot be circumvented by the states.296 While circuit court decisions are
not binding on other circuits, it is possible courts will follow Judge because
years, the Supreme Court has been taking even less cases, thereby leaving days when the
Court is not even in session. Linda Greenhouse, Dwindling Docket Mystifies Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/07/washington/07scotus.html
(“The number of cases the court decided with signed opinions [in 2006], 69, was the lowest
since 1953.”). The Supreme Court cites a lack of cases that meet its criteria as the primary
reason for the increasingly small number of cases being accepted in recent years. Id. It may
seem at the outset that because the election has occurred already, the issue had become moot
and that is why the Supreme Court denied review. However, Judge could have been reviewed because there is an exception to the mootness principle “where ‘(1) the challenged
action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration; and (2)
there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same
action again.’” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007)
(quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)). The Supreme Court has also determined
that election issues fall squarely within this exception. Id. at 462-64 (making it illegal to
broadcast, shortly before an election, a communication that names a federal candidate for
office and is aimed at the electorate could be challenged under the above criteria). See also
Davis v. FEC 128 554 U.S. 724, 730-32 (2008) (allowing a candidate to challenge federal
financing law even after an election had occurred); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814-16
(1969) (discussing an Illinois Election Law requiring at least 25,000 signatures including
200 from each district could be challenged after election); EUGENE GRESSMAN, ET AL.,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 928-29 (6th ed., 2007) (1986) (discussing that election issues are
not moot even after the election occurs). The Seventh Circuit’s amended opinion was in late
July which made it very difficult to seek review before the election without further compromising the integrity of the elections. Moreover, many states give similar practical effect to
their statutes, and so, this is an issue that will recur whenever a vacancy occurs in the final
one-third of a Senate term. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
296.
Although not in response to Judge, at least two states—Minnesota and Oklahoma—have tried to prevent this sixth-year special election requirement by statute. Minnesota has adopted a statute that allows the winner of the general election for a term that currently houses a temporary appointee to take over the term for the remaining time and subsequently serving the entire the six year term as well, thereby allowing a term of six years and
two months. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204D.28 (West 2010). Under this statute, Minnesota
allows Senators to serve for a period longer than six years by winning only a single election.
Id. This statute allows one election to serve “two separate and distinct purposes”: (1) filling
the final two months of the unexpired term; and (2) determining the winner of the next six
year term. WILLIAM F. HILDENBRAND AND ROBERT DOVE, THE TERM OF A SENATOR: WHEN
DOES IT BEGIN AND END?, S. Doc. No. 98-29, at 14 (1984). The Minnesota statute violates
the Constitution because it allows the election of a Senator to serve more than six years. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof for six Years.”) S. Doc. No. 9829, at 13-14 (“The people of Minnesota may not be empowered by their legislature to elect
United States Senators for terms greater than that authorized by the Constitution.”). It is
moreover unlikely the Senate would allow such a Senator to be sworn in on such an election.
Even if such a statute was not found unconstitutional, it is likely that the Senate will not
allow a Senator to begin their term immediately after the verification of the results. See JACK
MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41031, BEGINNING AND END OF THE TERMS OF UNITED
STATES SENATORS CHOSEN TO FILL SENATE VACANCIES 5 (2010) (“[in reference to Minnesota’s statute,] [t]he precedents of the Senate show that the Senate has refused to allow any
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it is the first case to explicitly analyze the language of the Seventeenth
Amendment and conclude that a special election is required.297 In addition,
Judge is one of the rare cases that carve an outer limit of constitutionality
under the Seventeenth Amendment.298 If states do not take Judge into consideration, they risk the possibility of their statutes being challenged under
the Seventeenth Amendment and then subsequently having to conduct a
special election in haste, as was the case in Illinois.299
To comply with Judge, almost all states will need to update their statutes.300 Part A first discusses which states will need to update their statutes.301 Part B discusses the need for states to establish realistic de minimis
periods—the period after which permanent appointments will be allowed.302
Part C argues that “joint election only” states, like Illinois, should update
their statutes to clarify what should happen in the state if a vacancy occurs
in the final one-third of the senate term.303

State by statute, executive order, or otherwise to vary the procedure for the election of Senators or to set the time or date for their service to begin.”). Similarly, Oklahoma’s statute
provides that when a vacancy occurs after March 1 of any year preceding the term’s end, no
special election is required and the governor must appoint the winner of the general election
for the remainder of the term. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 12-101(B) (West 1994).
Oklahoma therefore bypasses a special election and allows an appointment to be permanent
for the final two months of a term plus another six years on the basis of having won one
general election.
297.
See supra Part II.F (highlighting that congressional efforts to limit states’ ability
to appoint senators have lost momentum), and supra Part III.C (Judge is the only precedent
on the issue and holds that a special election is always required under the Seventeenth
Amendment).
298.
See Gietzen v. McMillan, 857 F. Supp. 777, 782 (D. Kan. 1994) (“Since the
Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez challenges to statutes prescribing the means of filling
vacancies in elected positions have generally been unsuccessful.”); supra Part III.A.2. Judge
is one of the rare cases that go against this trend.
299.
Illinois was only told of the requirement of a special election in the Seventh
Circuit’s amended opinion. This was handed down on July 22, 2010, thereby leaving approximately three months in which Illinois had to make the necessary arrangements. See
discussion supra Part III.D.
300.
Judge will require states to determine true de minimis periods and also, for those
states with statutes similar to Illinois, to clarify their statutes to determine what happens
when a Senate vacancy occurs in the final one-third of a Senate term. See discussion supra
Part III.C (discussing that the Seventh Circuit held that Illinois’ statute did not comply with
the Seventeenth Amendment largely because it allowed for permanent appointments).
301.
See infra Part V.A (providing breakdown of states’ statutes in determining
which states’ statutes will need to be updated or clarified).
302.
See infra Part V.B (arguing that currently, states’ de minimis periods are arbitrarily set and do not reflect the period of time actually needed by the state to conduct a
special election).
303.
See infra Part V.C (noting that thirty-eight states, in total, will need to clarify
their statutes to account for Judge).
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STATES WITH STATUTES RENDERED UNCONSTIITUIONAL UNDER JUDGE

A majority of states have statutes that violate the Seventeenth
Amendment as interpreted by Judge.304 Of the fifty states, the five “special
election only” states305—Alaska, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island and
Wisconsin—and the seven “short-term appointment” states306 —Alabama,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Texas, Vermont and Washington—
do not need to update their statutes, except for determining a de minimis
period.307 However, a large majority of states: the two “hybrid” states308 —
Louisiana and Mississippi—and the thirty-six remaining “joint election
only” states are all at risk of having their statutes struck down or set aside
under Judge.309 The two “hybrid” states violate the Seventeenth Amendment on its face because they explicitly allow states to bypass a special
election under certain circumstances, and consequently, these would be
struck down by a court following Judge.310 The thirty-six “joint election
only” states’ statutes violate the Seventeenth Amendment in their application because their practical effect is to allow a permanent appointment in
304.
See supra text accompanying notes 85-96 (providing a breakdown of the states’
statutes, which is also provided again in this section).
305.
The “special election only” states are those states that have chosen not to permit
a temporary appointee. Instead, the Senate seat remains vacant until a special election is
conducted. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 12. This compilation states that only four states (OK, OR, RI and WI) are “special election only” states.
However, a recent referendum in Alaska amended this statute but leaves out the provision
which granted temporary appointment powers to the governor. See NEALE, supra note 2, at
8.
306.
The “short term appointment” states are ones that allow temporary appointees
but conduct a special election as soon as possible and do not wait until the next general
election. Vermont and Washington require a special election within 90 days, Alabama requires a special election “forthwith,” Alaska requires a special election between 60 and 90
days, and Massachusetts requires a special election within 145-160 days. See NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 12.
307.
All states need to determine de minimis periods—the point from which permanent appointments will be allowed. As will be discussed infra Part V.B.2, states’ de minimis
periods are arbitrary and do not reflect the actual amount of time the state needs to conduct
the special election. However, because these twelve states hold a special election shortly
after the vacancy occurs, they do not need to update their statutes, like Illinois and the other
thirty-seven states do.
308.
These two states are Louisiana and Mississippi. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 12.
309.
The “joint election only” states are states that require the special election occur
in conjunction with the next general election. These thirty-five other states are: AZ, CO, DE,
FL, GA, HI, ID, IN, IA, KS, KY, ME, MD, MI, MN, MO, MT, NE, NV, NH, NM, NY, NC,
ND, OH, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WV, and WY. See id.
310.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §18:1278 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-855
(2010). Thus, both states violate the Seventeenth Amendment on its face by allowing an
appointment to be permanent if less than one year remains in the term.
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the final one-third of a Senate term; therefore, these would be set aside by a
court following Judge.311
While Seventh Circuit decisions are not binding on courts outside of
the circuit, it is still possible that other courts will follow Judge if confronted with a similar scenario.312 Therefore, states should update their statutes to prevent the hassle of conducting a special election with only a couple of months forewarning and the expense of litigation.313
B.

ESTABLISHING REALISTIC DE MINIMIS PERIODS

States will first need to establish a realistic de minimis period; if the
vacancy occurs in this carefully calculated time period, no election would
be needed and a temporary appointee could finish the remaining of the
term.314 Jackson allows for states to determine how many days are required
to conduct a special election, and if the vacancy occurs within that time
frame, then a special election is not needed.315 However, Judge qualifies
this by rejecting the time frame established by Illinois statute.316 It can be

311.
In Judge, the Seventh Circuit did not actually strike down the relevant election
code statute because the plaintiffs did not make the requisite showing of irreparable injury
required for a court to grant preliminary injunctive relief. Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 557
(7th Cir. 2010). By its language, that statute complies with the Seventeenth Amendment
because it requires that the special election be held with the general election even in the sixth
year. See Judge, 612 F.3d at 540 (quoting 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/25-8 (2010)). However,
these states just interpret their statutes to not require the special election in the sixth year of
the term. Therefore, such statutes would only be set aside after it becomes clear that the
particular state will not be holding a special election. See Judge, 612 F.3d at 557 (“[Plaintiffs
have not suffered any harm yet because] [t]here is still time for a writ of election to be issued
setting the date of the general election as the date for the special election as well”).
312.
States may follow the Seventh Circuit because Judge is the first decision to
explicitly read the Seventeenth Amendment to require an election. See id.
313.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs.”). Illinois also had to organize and conduct the special election in about three months.
314.
Judge did not overrule Jackson, but rather, used explicit wording from Jackson.
Jackson allowed for such a de minimis period. Judge, 612 F.3d at 556 (“We are not prepared
to say that this is such a short period of time that it should be dismissed as de minimis”)
(quoting Jackson v. Ogilvie, 426 F.2d 1333, 1337 (7th Cir. 1970)). See supra Part II.E, for a
discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Jackson.
315.
Jackson, 426 F.2d at 1336 (“Such provisions [i.e., Illinois’ statute requiring 162
days lapse before a special election could be held] would render it useless for the Governor
to issue a writ of election . . . and might well excuse issuance . . . [because] the period of
possible service could truly be deemed de minimis.” ((emphasis added)).
316.
See supra note 267 and accompanying text (Illinois statute required seven-andone-half months for a full-scale election or four-and-one-half months for even an abridged
election). States should determine the absolute shortest time that is needed. Courts have
already determined that states can take shortcuts with special elections, such as not requiring

346

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

inferred from Judge that three months is sufficient notice to combine a special election with a general election.317 A special election is required to fill a
vacancy provided only that there is ample time to conduct an expedited
special election, notwithstanding the likelihood for voter confusion.318 The
Seventh Circuit in Judge has already held that a state is not allowed to determine that a special election will not be held for arbitrary reasons.319 Accordingly, the de minimis period must be the period of time, wherein, if the
vacancy occurs, it would be impossible to conduct the special election.320
Many states have already established de minimis periods in the year
immediately preceding the expiration of the term from which point permanent appointments will be allowed.321 However, such discretionary cut-offs
are not reflective of the actual amount of time the state would need to conduct an abridged special election.322 Moreover, the two “hybrid” states—
primaries. See Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 941 F.2d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
Pennsylvania is not required to hold a primary for a special election).
317.
Here, the amended opinion was handed down on July 22, 2010. The injunction
order was entered on August 2, 2010. Illinois therefore had approximately three months
before the general election.
318.
This is inferred from the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the proviso clause.
The court held that it modifies only the preceding word “election.” Accordingly, states could
not prevent an election from occurring, but could only control aspects of the election, such
as the “Times, Places and Manner.” Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 550-52 (7th Cir. 2010).
319.
Judge, 612 F.3d at 555. The court stated:
[T]he second paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment establishes a
rule for all circumstances: it imposes a duty on state executives to make
sure that an election fills each vacancy; it obliges state legislatures to
promulgate rules for vacancy elections; and it allows for temporary appointments until an election occurs.
Id.
320.
Under Judge, a period can still be de minimis, but that timing wasn’t the time
that remained in Illinois. Presumably, if it would have been impossible for Illinois to conduct
an election and verify the results with little to no time remaining in the term, it would excuse
the state from conducting the election. See Judge, 612 F.3d at 556 (holding that the period
from verification of November results to January 3rd, when the term would end, is not de
minimis). It seems that even if the special election cannot somehow be combined with the
general election immediately preceding the year in which the term ends, that a special election must still be held in late-November or maybe even early-December. Presumably, if
there would be no time left in the term after an abridged election was conducted and the
election results were expeditiously verified, then it may excuse the state from conducting the
special election. In all other circumstances, it seems the Seventh Circuit would require the
election. See supra notes 170-187 and accompanying text (discussing that the governor is
commanded to issue the writ, and the state may only control aspects of the election; it cannot
conclude that a special election is not required under some circumstances).
321.
These de minimis periods are built into the statutes because many states say no
election will be held if a vacancy occurs after a certain date. See infra note 322 and accompanying text.
322.
For the most part, these de minimis periods are arbitrary. For example, Alaska
allows permanent appointments where the vacancy occurs within sixty days of the primary.
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Louisiana, and Mississippi—require the governor to schedule a special
election unless there is less than one year remaining in the term, in which
case, the appointment can be permanent.323 In contrast, other states have
been much more realistic in determining their de minimis periods in the
year preceding the expiration of the term.324 These de minimis periods seem
more realistic insofar as it would be nearly impossible to conduct an election when these vacancies occur since so little time remains.325
C.

CLARIFYING “JOINT ELECTION ONLY” STATES’ STATUTES

In addition, the thirty-six “joint election only” states that permit a special election to occur only in conjunction with a general election will need
to clarify their statutes to account for scenarios where the vacancy occurs in
the final one-third of the senate term.326 If the vacancy arises in the first
two-thirds of the term, these states can maintain their current system under
Valenti.327 However, if the vacancy occurs in the final one-third of the term,
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 15.40.140 (West 2010). Alaska conducts its primaries in late-August,
so late-June would be the last date the vacancy could occur and still result in a special election. See 2010 Congressional Primary Dates and Candidate Filing Deadlines for Ballot
Access, FED. ELECTION COMM., http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2010/2010pdates.pdf (last
visited Dec. 29, 2010) [hereinafter FEC Congressional Primary Dates]. This would likely be
too soon under Judge, because Illinois had even less time to conduct the special election.
North Dakota allows permanent appointments if the vacancy occurs within ninety days of
the primary. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16.1-13-08 (West 1992). North Dakota conducts its
primaries in early June, so even a vacancy in March could lead to a permanent appointment.
See FEC Congressional Primary Dates, supra note 322. This, too, would be too soon. Oklahoma allows permanent appointments where the vacancy occurs after March 1. OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 12-101(B) (West 1994). This is also too soon under Judge. Ohio allows a
permanent appointment where the vacancy occurs in the final year of the term. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3521.02 (West 1990). Although Ohio is similar to the hybrid system, the primary distinction is that Ohio generally requires that the special election occur with the next
general election. In contrast, the hybrid system states require that the election occur soon
thereafter except for the final year, where the appointment can be permanent. But these states
raise the same concerns for a court following Judge.
323.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §18:1278 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-855
(2010).
324.
For example, Nebraska allows permanent appointments if the vacancy occurs
sixty days prior to the general election. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-565 (West 1995). Idaho
allows permanent appointments if the vacancy occurs thirty days before the general election.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 59-910 (West 2010).
325.
The statutes of Nebraska and Idaho are in stark contrast to the other state statutes in that respect. See supra notes 322-323 and accompanying text.
326.
The practical effect of Illinois’ statute is constitutional if the vacancy occurs in
the first two-thirds of a senate term. However, it is only when the vacancy occurs in the final
one-third that the practical effect of the statute is to not conduct a special election. Thus, it is
only vacancies in the final one-third of a term that were the issue of concern in Judge.
327.
Valenti stands for the proposition that states have reasonable discretion to determine the timing of the election, and can do so with the next general election, even if that
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states will need to establish whether they will follow the Illinois route, or
whether they will adopt the “short term appointment” system.328
The Illinois route—the route taken by Illinois in the aftermath of
Judge—entails holding the special election in conjunction with the general
election even in the sixth year of the term, followed by an expedited election verification process.329 If this system is adopted, there are some concerns states will need to be aware of: first, the quality of representation may
be inconsistent or substantially lowered.330 For example, in Illinois, although Burris had filled Obama’s seat for nearly two years, he could not
finish the term;331 instead, Mark Kirk finished the final one month of
Obama’s term and began a new six year term on January 3, 2011.332 But
there is no guarantee under this system that the person who wins the six
year term will also win the special election; of the candidates running for
both terms, a substantial number of people decided to vote for a small-party
candidate in the special election as opposed to a big-party candidate.333 Although it is unlikely a small-party candidate would win the seat, the resulting shift in voters could be substantial if the two big-party candidates were
only separated by a small margin.334 In such an instance, the winners of the
two elections could be different, and the candidate who wins only the unexgeneral election is twenty-nine months away. Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 86768 (W.D.N.Y. 1968). See supra Part III.E for a discussion of Valenti.
328.
See infra notes 329-350 for the Illinois route and infra notes 351-358 for the
“short term appointment” route.
329.
See Judge v. Quinn, No 09 C 1231, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ill. Aug 2, 2010) (order
granting permanent injunction).
330.
The quality of representation may be a factor because depending on which
system is adopted, it could determine how much time the elected senator will be in office..
331.
Due to the lack of time, the district court conducted a “closed election” in which
only those candidates who were already running for the six-year term could run for the special election. Id. slip op. at 5. However, where there is additional time, states may allow
additional candidates to run, or allow a closed system which includes only those running for
the six-year term plus the appointee. It seems unlikely anyone else would really be interested
in running for a two month senate term. Id.
332.
Lynn Sweet, Mark Kirk Sworn In as Illinois Senator to Fill Obama’s Unexpired
Term, POLITICS DAILY, http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/11/29/mark-kirk-sworn-in-asillinois-senator-to-fill-obamas-unexpired (last visited Dec. 27, 2010).
333.
For the regular six year term, Republican Mark Kirk received 48.2% of the
votes while runner-up, Alexi Giannoulias received 46.3 percent of the vote. However, for the
unexpired term, Kirk received 47.5% of the votes while runner-up Giannoulias received 46.2
percent
of
the
votes.
See
CHI.
TRIB.
ELECTION
CENTER,
http://elections.chicagotribune.com/results/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2010).
334.
Here 0.7 percent of the voters who voted for Kirk for the six year term did not
vote for him for the unexpired term. In contrast, only 0.1% of voters who voted for Giannoulias did not also vote for him for the unexpired term. Had these two candidate been separated by 0.8% (a margin which would not be uncommon), it could have led to different
candidate winning the terms. See id.
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pired term would have little incentive to adjust to any learning curve in the
Senate.335
A second concern states should be aware of is the possibility that a
special election conducted with the general election could lead to a vacancy
in the House of Representatives.336 In the 111th Congress, almost half of
the current Senators came from the House of Representatives.337 With such
a large number of Representatives later seeking office in the Senate, it is
probable that these senate hopefuls will also run for the special election
immediately preceding the six year term as well.338 If that candidate wins
335.
For example, if Alexi Giannoulias—the Democratic nominee—had won only
the special election, he would only have been in office for the time period of verification of
the results to January 3rd, a period of about a month. This can hardly be labeled “quality
time” in the senate.
336.
This was precisely what happened in Illinois when Mark Kirk won the special
election. He had to resign from the House of Representatives to accept the position. See infra
notes 340-342 and accompanying text.
337.
Altogether, forty-eight of the Senators in the 111th Congress came from the
House of Representatives. In Class I (2007-2013 term), there are thirteen Senators: Sherrod
Brown (D-OH), Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Benjamin Cardin (D-MD), Thomas Carper (DDE), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Robert Menendez (D-NJ), Bill Nelson (D-FL), Debbie
Stabenow (D-MI), John Ensign (R-NV), Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Olympia Snowe (R-ME), Roger
Wicker (R-MS) and Bernard Sanders (I-VT). In Class II (2009-2015), there are twelve Senators: Max Baucus (D-MI), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Tom Harkin (D-IA), Tim Johnson (D-SD),
Jack Reed (D-RI), Mark Udall (D-CO), Thomas Udall (D-NM), Saxby Chambliss (R-GA),
Thad Cochran (R-MS), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), James Inhofe (R-OK) and Pat Roberts (RKS). Finally, in Class III (2011-2017), there are twenty-three Senators: Barbara Boxer (DCA), Christopher Dodd (D-CT), Byron Dorgan (D-ND), Daniel Inouye (D-HI), Blanche
Lincoln (D-AR), Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), Harry Reid (D-NV), Chuck Schumer (D-NY),
Ronald Wyden (D-OR), Sam Brownback (R-KS), Jim Bunning (D-KY), Richard Burr (RNC), Thomas Coburn (R-OK), Michael Crapo (R-ID), James DeMint (R-SC), Charles Grassley (R-IA), Judd Gregg (R-NH), Johnny Isakson (R-GA), Mark Kirk (R-IL), John McCain
(R-AZ), Richard Shelby (R-AL), John Thune (R-SD) and David Vitter (R-LA). See UNITED
STATES
SENATE
BIOGRAPHIES
111TH
CONGRESS,
http://senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/three_column_table/Senators.htm (last visited Dec.
28, 2010) (click on particular Class to access Senators’ Biographies).
338.
Mark Kirk ran in this special election and even made a campaign video to solicit
votes for this special session. Marc A. Thiessen, Mark Kirk, the Lame-duck Killer, WASH.
POST
(Aug.
17,
2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/08/16/AR2010081602818.html; SAVE US FROM THE LAME DUCK
HOME PAGE, http://saveusfromthelameduck.com/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2010) (click on “Hear
Mark Kirk’s Words on the Lame Duck”). One incentive for running for this special session
may be because it would allow a candidate to gain seniority in the Senate. Because these
candidates would take office in late November or early December, they would have seniority
over all of the senators who took office on January 3rd in the following year. Seniority is
important because it determines committee assignments. See Seniority, SENATE.GOV,
http://www.senate.gov/reference/Sessions/Traditions/Seniority.htm (last visited Dec. 29,
2010). Seniority is also vital for states because it could heavily influence what federal contracts a state gets. Rachel D’Oro, Murkowski Upset Erases Alaska Seniority in the Senate,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/02/murkowski-
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the special election, the district represented by that candidate would go unrepresented for the remainder of the term because the winner of the special
election would take office in December, as opposed to January 3rd, when
their terms in the House of Representatives would end.339 This is precisely
what happened in Illinois; Mark Kirk’s special election victory created a
vacancy in the Tenth District of Illinois.340 Consequently, while Kirk was
serving the remainder of Obama’s term,341 the Tenth District went unrepresented for that period.342
Finally, states will need to create an expedited special election certification statute.343 An expedited verification schedule is needed because the
practical effect of these statutes is to allow the winner of a special election
to take office on January 3rd, by following its typical election verification
schedule.344 However, in order for the winner of the special election to take
office before the term ends, an expedited verification process will be neces-

upset-erases-al_n_703602.html (Murkowski’s loss in the GOP primary for the 2010 general
election could be devastating for Alaska); Alan Blinder, Senate’s Seniority System Leaves
Most
big
States
out
of
Power,
CHRON
(July
25,
2010),
http://blogs.chron.com/txpotomac/2010/07/senates_seniority_system_leave.html (providing
example that North Dakota receives more federal funds than Oklahoma despite having only
one-sixth the population because North Dakota has a committee chairman).
339.
See Gill, supra note 3 (noting that the House of Representatives’ term ends on
January 3rd).
340.
Kirk was the Representative for the Tenth District of Illinois. See About Mark
Kirk, KIRK FOR SENATE, http://www.kirkforsenate.com/?page_id=2 (last visited Dec. 27,
2010).
341.
Kirk was not allowed to take office until after the first week of the lame duck
session. Danny Yardon, Kirk Can’t Join Senate at Start of Lame Duck Session, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 8, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/11/08/kirk-cant-join-senate-at-start-oflame-duck/.
342.
Lynne Stiefel, 10th Congressional District: Seat to be Empty for Part of LameDuck
Session,
SUN
TIMES
MEDIA
(Nov.
5,
2010),
http://www.pioneerlocal.com/glenview/news/2869540,glenview-10thseat-111110-s1.article.
There were also several important bills pending in the House of Representatives, including:
the Bush-era tax cuts, President Obama's Making Work Pay tax credit, and a stopgap spending bill. Id. The Tenth District was the only district not represented during this time frame.
Id.
343.
Typically, state statutes are designed to verify the results by January 3rd of the
year after the election. This allows ample time for challenges against the results and to otherwise ensure that no mistakes were made in the counting of the ballots, among other things.
See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18A (2008) (The Illinois State Board of Elections has until
December 3, 2010 to certify and proclaim the results of the election); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/22-9.1 (2008) (allowing parties to petition for a recount after the election has been proclaimed).
344.
All statutes break down the process and allow ample time for re-verification and
time to challenge the results. Illinois’ statute is one example. See statutes cited supra note
343 for Illinois verification schedule.
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sary.345 The district court in Illinois provided an expedited schedule, which
would have verified the special election results by November 23, 2010, at
the latest.346 Currently, Ohio is the only state that explicitly allows for expedited verification of their special election results.347
The primary benefit to adopting the Illinois route is that it is much
cheaper for states to conduct a special election in conjunction with the general election.348 In addition, the advantages enumerated in Valenti would
also apply.349 For example, holding the special election in conjunction with
the general election would: (1) maximize voter turnout; (2) allow candidates to finance their campaigns more easily since financing in an off-year
is more difficult; and (3) prevent inconvenience to the state in having to
conduct a special election.350 Therefore, this is one route the “joint election
only” states could take when a vacancy occurs in the final one-third of the
term.
Alternatively, states can adopt the “short term appointment” system
when the vacancy occurs in the final one-third of the senate term.351 Under
this system, the state would allow for a short term temporary appointment
followed by a quick special election.352 For example, if Illinois had adopted
this system, a special election could have been called promptly after Obama
resigned from the senate seat on November 16, 2008.353 This would have
345.
For example, in Judge, the practical effect of Illinois’ statute in question was to
allow permanent appointments because the results are not verified until January 3rd. Judge,
612 F.3d at 538.
346.
Judge v. Quinn, No 09 C 1231, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. Aug 2, 2010) (order granting permanent injunction).
347.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3521.02 (2010) (“[T]he appointee shall hold office
until the fifteenth day of December.”). None of the other states allow for expedited verification of the special election results, meaning the winner would take office by January 3rd. All
of the other “joint election only” states do not explicitly create an expedited verification
schedule.
348.
Pat Gauen, Illinois Voters Face Confusing, Simultaneous Senate Elections,
STLTODAY.COM (July 29, 2010), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/columns/patgauen/article_0d862265-337e-51a1-9691-c6bcaa6d5a01.html (observing that the special
election in Illinois will cost nothing more than the ink to print the ballots).
349.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
350.
See Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 859 (W.D.N.Y. 1968) (providing
reasons why New York was justified in waiting until the next general election to conduct its
special election).
351.
Some states are permanently categorized as “short term appointment” states.
These seven states are: AL, AR, CT, MA, TX, VT and WA. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 12.
352.
See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 12 for the exact
requirements in these seven states.Typically, these states require a special election within 90
days of the vacancy occurring. See id.
353.
Obama resigned on November 16, 2008. Gill, supra note 3; Mason, supra note
4.
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ensured quality representation because the winner would still have approximately a year and a half in the term to serve.354
However, the primary disadvantage to this system is the cost of conducting a special election.355 It would have cost Illinois between $30 million to $50 million dollars, by some estimates.356 However, certain circumstances may warrant a special election; for example, Burris’ appointment
had been tainted by the Blagojevich scandal.357 These circumstances almost
led Illinois to become a “short term appointment” state and conduct a special election in early 2009, although the Illinois Legislature eventually decided against it.358 These are the two routes states can choose in clarifying
their statutes.359
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Judge v. Quinn is an important decision because it is one of the few cases that carves an outer limit within
354.
Even if Illinois’ statute requires 162 days lapse before an election was held, this
would mean if the vacancy occurred on November 16, 2008, an election could have still
occurred by late April-early May, still leaving more than one-and-a-half years.
355.
Most recently a special election was conducted in Massachusetts, costing the
state about $6.3 million dollars. See Mass. Reimbursing Communities for Special Election to
Fill the Late Sen. Edward Kennedy’s Seat, MASSLIVE.COM (May 10, 2010),
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2010/05/mass_reimbursing_communities_f.html.
356.
Caryn Rousseau, Illinois Can’t Afford Special Election: State Officials,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/12/15/illinois-cantafford-spec_n_151173.html.
357.
Blagojevich was accused of attempting to sell the Senate seat. Kathy Chaney,
Senate Appointment Tainted by Blagojevich, DEFENDER (Dec. 10, 2008),
http://www.chicagodefender.com/article-2666-senate-appointment-tainted-byblagojevich.html. After a summer-long trial, Blagojevich was ultimately convicted of one
count for lying to the FBI, but the jury was deadlocked on the remaining twenty-three
counts, including the allegation of attempting to sell Obama’s Senate seat. See Blagojevich
Trial: Only Slim Majority wants Blagojevich Retried, CHI. TRIB. MOBILE (Sept. 8, 2010),
http://mobile.chicagotribune.com/wap/news/text.jsp?sid=289&nid=21219811&cid=17689&
scid=-1&ith=4&title=Blagojevich+Trial.
358.
The Illinois General Assembly was considering proposal to amend their statute
to allow for short term appointment and sought advice from the Illinois Attorney General as
to whether such an action would be constitutional. See Attorney General Memorandum,
supra note 9, at *1. This memorandum was written in February, 2009, and may have resulted in a special election sometime in mid-2009. Id. However, the Illinois Legislature
ultimately decided not to conduct the special election. See supra note 10 and accompanying
text (noting that the Illinois Legislature had requested that the Illinois Attorney General’s
Office write a brief to determine if it was possible to move the election to an earlier date).
See discussion supra note 10 (discussing potential reasons why the Legislature ultimately
decided against it).
359.
See supra notes 329-350 (noting the Illinois route); see also supra notes 351358 (discussing the “short term appointment” route).
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which states can operate in regards to their senate vacancies. The Seventh
Circuit held that a governor was commanded to issue a writ of election in
the case of a senate vacancy and a state could not prevent a special election
from occurring. This holding runs counter to Supreme Court precedent in
Valenti and Rodriguez, as well as the Seventh Circuit’s own precedent in
Jackson and Lynch. In addition, this holding is inconsistent with the legislative history of the vacancy provision. Nonetheless, Judge is valid precedent
and therefore, states will need to update their senate vacancy statutes to
comply with the decision or risk litigation and substantial inconvenience in
the final months before an election. Under Judge, states will need to determine their de minimis periods. Moreover, the two “discretionary” states will
need to adopt a new system because neither governors nor states have the
discretion to forgo a special election. Finally, the thirty-six “joint election
only” states, including Illinois, will need to clarify their statutes to determine what happens when the senate vacancy occurs in the final one-third of
the term.
Illinois’ special election experience has been a memorable one, albeit
for the wrong reasons. States should learn from Illinois and update their
senate vacancy statutes accordingly. As is true with preventing any type of
litigation or hassle, the course of action is always proactive and preventative in nature.

